Netanyahu's new rogue state is Israel

Hours after the five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council (the "P-5") announced an interim deal that pulls Iran back from the threshold of nuclear weapons capacity, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has done more than denounce the agreement. By reasserting Israel's right to attack Iran at its own discretion, even following this international accord, Netanyahu has effectively set Israel as the Middle East's new rogue state - even without actually attacking Iran.

With Iran formally committed to the agreement, Israel is now the nation standing defiantly against world opinion and the international community. None of those countries party to the agreement - including France and the United States - can now abide an Israeli attack. 

Israel is routinely criticized and condemned, with or without justification, for all manner of violations of international law. Yet it enjoys positive relations with dozens of countries and is seamlessly integrated into the global economy, and it has never directly defied the Security Council. Though the Council as an entity has not formalized the agreement, the P-5 and the European Union are all officially signed on. Agree or disagree (as I did elsewhere) with Netanyahu's assessment of the negotiations and the deal, he is now declaring Israel to be above the Security Council.

Netanyahu's fantasy date with destiny

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently acted as though Israel has a veto on any negotiations with Iran, as though reminding world powers - and Tehran - that Iran's nuclear program is only a concern for Israel and not for the entire region and the international community. Every step forward in the process has been derided, every sanction discounted, even as he says it's better than nothing. Even as he acts like the judge for all nations.

Netanyahu speaks as though only he and only Israel are concerned or actively fighting Iran's ambitions. He has already ridiculed the discussions underway in Geneva as "The Deal of the Century," even though limiting - and not completely dismantling - Iran's nuclear program was always the stated goal. He warns us all not to trust Iran, as though anyone outside Tehran trusts that regime. Anyone. This isn't about world leaders being naive, it's about working within political and strategic realities.

What Netanyahu won't acknowledge, is that neither Israel nor America has a way to decisively stop Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. The best option is some deal for verifiable controls on further enrichment and weaponization. While dismissing the use of sanctions or negotiations, the Prime Minister has offered no realistic alternative. None. 

Despite his tough talk, there is no surefire way to deny Iran a nuclear capability. Sanctions, blockade and assassinations have pushed Iran to the point of considering measures to verify and limit its program going forward. There has never been a point at which any U.S. President or Israeli Prime Minister could have permanently neutralized Iran's program, either successfully and effectively or without Israelis paying a catastrophic political and economic cost. Israel's own military experts have routinely warned against attacking Iran.

On Hagel, Jewish groups squandered an opportunity

Despite all the public kvetching about Israel and "the Jewish lobby" (by our own Jewish lobby), serious policymakers in Washington and around the world are far more interested in what Chuck Hagel's nomination for U.S. Secretary of Defense means for Iran than for Israel. Had American Jewish organizations figured this out, and/or had they cared, they would have joined the conversation about substantive next steps to end Iran's quest for nuclear weapons, which is about expert problem-solving rather than ideological litmus tests.

But no. Major and minor groups -- "mainstream" and outright Republican alike -- are tweeting and blogging their "pro-Israel" talking points, and Senators are being inundated by the same kinds of knee-jerk admonitions that used to make recovering Senators like Chuck Hagel and Joe Biden roll their eyes back on Capitol Hill. Despite this, a third former Senator, Barack Obama, has pushed forward to counter Iran and address its nuclear program in ways his predecessor could not. And still, our community seems incapable of acting like Obama's partner instead of his conscience.

When the Senate Armed Services Committee considers Hagel's nomination, I do NOT want to hear his views on why Israel is our most reliable ally in the Middle East, or anywhere. At the dawn of a new Congress and a second Obama term, this should be the opportunity to address major decision points on Iran (sanctions, force projection, counter-terrorism), Afghanistan, North Korea, and the fundamental budgeting and direction of our military infrastructure, preparedness, and personnel.

Israel's security will not be enhanced by becoming the centerpiece of confirmation hearings for a Cabinet post which by definition involves close cooperation with Israel's military establishment. Any distraction from the  strategic UNKNOWNS in the region and globally will undermine the stated goals of the Jewish advocacy organizations that are mobilized at this moment, whether to oppose Hagel outright or merely under the pretense of asking "the probing questions".

After Patriot missiles and Iron Dome, supporting Israel and U.S.-Israel relations ought not to be open for debate, yet major community organizations are inviting just such a re-examination through their expressions of "concern". Who cares whether Hagel would have been the "first choice" of any American Jewish leader? SHOULD we care, and if so, then why exactly?

Like most of the big decisions facing America at this time, this one should not be about Israel or Jewish organizations. Trying to make it that way diminishes our relevance as a community, for ourselves and to the world. Most importantly, it diverts attention from Israel's true needs and those of the United States.

Iran's sense of vulnerability casts a wide net

The Gulf expects more from the United States, and less from Iran. Surprised?

On the military side, admirals and generals want to know our plans and protocols for managing the threat from Iran, on tactical as well as strategic levels. Politically, diplomats and bloggers alike blame us for letting Mubarak fall in favor of the new Islamist Pharaoh, Mohamed Morsi. On Syria, opinion is divided on whether the United States ought to directly intervene militarily or simply provide advanced weapons to the rebels. But then maybe, judging from the current blowback on Morsi and his ascendant Muslim Brotherhood, we should be stepping in to prop up Syrian President Bashar Assad... Stability vs. democracy, or secular vs. religious autocracy.

Reflecting the outdated relevance of Wikileaks, Gulf regimes are no longer itching for a U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Instead, they are acutely aware that if Iran gets lucky with just one anti-ship mine, all oil shipments will come to a standstill. The closer Iran gets to achieving "breakout" capacity, or to crossing one of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's ever-shifting "red lines", the more regional leaders understand that neither diplomatic nor military options promise an easy resolution. And once again, regardless of the nuclear file, Iran's ongoing opportunism is evident in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and potentially Bahrain. The regime in Tehran is as happy to take advantage of popular Arab unrest as it was to seize full control of Abu Musa from the United Arab Emirates 20 years ago (or to regain its former sovereignty, according to the Iranians).

For all their defiance and bluster, Iranians remain concerned about their own rights to security and national self-defense: The entire punitive premise of international nuclear negotiators and the sanctions backing them up leaves Iranians feeling humiliated and cornered. This is not merely posturing -- it's a genuine feeling.

I do not discount Iran's violation of international treaties and conventions on the transparency and verifiability of its nuclear program, nor its propensity to support terrorism and undermine diplomatic solutions, especially where the Israelis and Palestinians are concerned. Sure, Iran is responsible for its current dilemma. But so long as Iran feels deep down that its very sovereignty and survival are being threatened, it is unlikely to willingly give up what has become its nuclear insurance policy.

While the West cannot afford to back down, it is increasingly likely that Iran will nevertheless succeed in attaining nuclear weapons capacity within the next five years. Leveraging the existing and future sanctions and other measures, it may be possible to fashion a process and terms of reference that acknowledge and allay Iranian fears and also establish a framework for taking the centrifuges off line.

An Iran that WANTS to own nuclear weapons can potentially be deterred. An Iran that feels it NEEDS to own nuclear weapons will be truly dangerous and unpredictable. If our efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran are able to address both points, we just might succeed in the short term and also open the door to a long-term process of normalization.

Netanyahu's 'hurry up and wait' moment

I have a few observations on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's speech last week to the United Nations General Assembly:

1. Had the Prime Minister delivered the exact same speech to the annual banquet of any major Jewish organization or to the Israeli Knesset... well, maybe he already has. In fact, as usual, the target audience for his UN speech seems to have been Israelis and Jews around the world. The world leaders and diplomats sitting in the GA Hall were really just props, or better, foils so he could be seen "talking truth to power". Brilliant, if no longer original.

2. Netanyahu implicitly ceded the peace process discussion to the Palestinians, whose leader Mahmoud Abbas understandably focused his GA remarks on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. His only reference or rebuttal to the Palestinians was a brief nod to the concept of a negotiated solution and uniting the three great faiths.

3. By eclipsing the peace process with his usual lecture on medieval barbarians and clash of civilizations, and -- lest we forget -- the Holocaust -- Netanyahu allowed no hint that Israel is interested in substantively addressing the Palestinian issue. The message to European governments, and to the Russians and Chinese, is that their interest in regional stability can only be satisfied by helping Israel stop Iran. And Israel makes no promises after that.

4. Netanyahu's speech underscored the sense of many around the world -- including decision-makers whose support Israel and the United States still need -- that a nuclear Iran is an Israeli issue more than a global concern.

5. Forget the cartoon bomb that's generated so much buzz. The real last-minute prop in Netanyahu's speech was his notion of red lines for stopping Iran. It used to be that Iran had to be prevented from reaching "breakout capacity" -- the point at which it could continue to produce a weapon on its own. Then there was the "zone of immunity" -- the point at which Iran could continue its program without vulnerability to an aerial attack. Now the "red lines" connote the point at which Iran has enough highly enriched uranium to produce its first bomb ("90%") -- leaving a window as narrow as a few weeks (according to Netanyahu). Let's forgive the Obama administration for not updating its policy language fast enough to keep up with Netanyahu's moving goalposts and changing labels, but it now appears that all the hype was just that -- Netanyahu's red lines just happen to correspond neatly with longstanding U.S. policy. Or, as Netanyahu's people have phrased it, President Obama now agrees with the Prime Minister. Smooth...

6. One more shifting benchmark is the effectiveness of sanctions, which until last week were being downplayed by Netanyahu as largely ineffective. But after a phone chat with President Obama, and the leaking of his government's own report that international sanctions are actually having a great impact on Iran, his speech encouraged governments to continue pushing the very sanctions and diplomacy that his minions have been ridiculing.

7. The speech built up to a crescendo of apocalyptic doom and urgency, only to finish with no clear steps for implementing his red lines. After months of spiraling rhetoric and reports about the immediacy of the Iranian threat and the likelihood of an Israeli attack -- including widespread speculation as to whether such an attack would be delayed until after Madonna's summer concert -- Netanyahu pushed off any attack until the middle of next year, at the earliest. For those who honestly believe that next summer will already be too late to stop Iran, Netanyahu's speech was a blatant act of betrayal. The rest of us will have to scratch our heads and try to get back to serious business, which includes stopping Iran's nuclear program.

"It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." -- Shakespeare, Macbeth.

Feel-good lectures at UN undermine Israel's security

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has announced that he will attend the UN General Assembly in New York later this month, specifically to re-warn the world of the dangers posed by a nuclear Iran. Beyond that, he wants to impress on fellow world leaders -- and a global audience -- that Israel intends to use force to stop Iran's nuclear program regardless of current or potential international sanctions.

Ah, where to begin?

WRONG MESSENGER

Israel definitely faces a significant threat if Iran acquires a deliverable nuclear weapon, and the whole Middle East would be plunged into a new regime of fear. But Israel -- and Jewish organizations -- are the absolute worst bearers of these warnings. When the Presidents of the United States, France and Argentina, and the UN Secretary-General, have issued such warnings, this reinforces the notion that Iran is a threat to all nations and not only to the Jewish State. So why reduce this to a "Jewish" issue, which only helps Iran stave off even stronger sanctions? 

WRONG MESSAGE

The fact is, any sanctions are better than no sanctions, and especially the tougher variety that President Obama and former French President Sarkozy were able to convince the Security Council to adopt -- with the grudging assent of Russia and China. Every time Netanyahu dismisses the value of such sanctions, he discourages governments from ENFORCING the current sanctions. And every time he refers to a military strike -- before Iran even acquires an actual weapon -- he undermines the case for any sanctions. And by not giving sanctions a chance, he forfeits any possibility of immunity should Israel actually attack. 

If Iran is really so dangerous...

If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu really considers Iran an "existential threat", why hasn't he acted to remove other items from Israel's strategic plate? He could stop expanding settlements and take the initiative to resume talks with the Palestinians, so at least he'll have some diplomatic capital to lose if Israel does strike Iran -- at the moment, he's barely treading water. He could act as though Israel is really waiting to see if sanctions work, so he might have a few friends (France, Croatia, USA?) if Israel ends up attacking.

What has Netanyahu actually done so far? He has been lobbying his own Cabinet and assorted Western leaders on the merits of a hypothetical Israeli attack. The result of this down-beat on the war drums has been to undermine credibility of the same crippling sanctions against Iran that Israel has been demanding, and which U.S. President Barack Obama and other allies have been pushing. In Netanyahu's narrative, any sanctions are either too little or too late -- so why bother at all? His policy on settlement expansion has been so defiant (or determined, if you prefer) that the Obama administration has given up on stopping settlements or promoting peace with the Palestinians, and is now indistinguishable from its immediate predecessor on the issue.

What has Netanyahu NOT been doing? He has NOT been preparing Israel for the consequences of any military confrontation with Iran. Even if such a strike were to become unavoidable -- and even if it could succeed in significantly derailing Iran's nuclear program -- the backlash and retaliation against Israel would be devastating. Is there a plan for that, or any urgency to prepare Israel's 8 million inhabitants, most of whom were born after the 1973 war that last brought Israel close to the brink of destruction, for what might easily escalate into a Total War?

Auschwitz won't stop Iran

2009: Bibi proves the Holocaust was real...

I shouldn't have to say this, but: I take the Holocaust very seriously, and much of my schooling and my career has been devoted to studying and honoring the memory of the Holocaust.

Having said that, and setting aside my concerns with some of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's strategic and diplomatic behavior vis-a-vis Iran, he seems dangerously obsessed with applying Holocaust terminology to contemporary situations.

Sometimes, as I blogged last year, he has used the Holocaust to try and impress world leaders with the overwhelming evidence that the Holocaust is a historical fact, and that therefore Iranian President Ahmadinejad is lying... and that therefore Iran has no right to develop nuclear weapons. Right. The problem is, there are a few logical gaps there, beyond the fact that the United Nations -- where he delivered such a speech -- had already established a firm policy of Holocaust commemoration and condemning Holocaust denial. And Netanyahu played no part in that achievement (as reflected in his speech).

Evidently, the Prime Minister was looking to impress his voters back home, and it worked -- as usual. This is becoming a ritual for him, much like Rudy Giuliani trotting out 9/11 at every opportunity back when he was running for President.

Gaming Iran, Europe, US, and Israel

For the past decade, Israeli and American officials -- and even Europeans -- have offered differing and changing estimates of when Iran might achieve a nuclear weapons capability, or even just when it will cross the threshold of having everything it needs on its own. Has Iran's program been so uneven, that these estimates keep changing? Yes, and no.

It's true, sanctions and other distractions (see under: Stuxnet) may undermine Iran's abilities to proceed, but the fact that different politicians and intelligence officials from different countries can't seem to agree, reflects something more tactical. If Iran is perilously close to a breakthrough -- say, less than one year away -- the Europeans can argue that it's already too late for further sanctions. On the other hand, if Iran is more than two years away, then what's so urgent about sanctions, anyway?? Part of the variation in U.S. and Israeli estimates is geared toward this sweet spot of European urgency.

Washington has an interest in delaying -- or determining -- the timing of a hypothetical Israeli attack against Iran's facilities, so better to say Iran isn't even close. Maybe Iran hasn't even yet decided whether to really go all the way... Of course, it's continuing the program, "just in case".

The Israelis will never be satisfied that any U.S. President is really on their side with this issue, so they need to keep us guessing.

Whatever any government or individual says, it stands to reason that Iran is pursuing its nuclear program as fast as it can. It's suffering mightily -- financially and politically -- so it may as well.

Iran already reaps nuclear benefits

Iran already enjoys a degree of nuclear prestige in its confrontation with Israel and around the Middle East.

How is Israel supposed to respond to the ongoing effort to attack Israeli and Jewish targets, including today's car bombs in New Delhi and Tbilisi? Since Israel needs to hold its fire, pending an all-out assault (as advertised) should Iran attain nuclear weapons status, it will be limited to responding in kind, or via proxy by attacking Hezbollah targets in Iran or elsewhere. And the mysterious assassinations of specific Iranian physicists and engineers will continue as needed.

Israel and the West may have little choice in the matter, given the very real implications of a nuclear Persia, and the difficulties of holding together a rough coalition of Europeans, Russia, and China. But it may be noted that, as part of our strategy against that nuclear contingency, we must limit our responses to threats or attacks that fall below the nuclear threshold.

In this sense, and only in this sense, the fact that Israel is deterred from responding in full force is analogous to the Cold War-era constraints of limited response. To avoid introducing all-out Soviet and/or Chinese intervention, the United States had to limit its own intervention in Korea and Vietnam, as well as Czechoslovakia and East Berlin.

Sanctions definitely bite, but -- by virtue of "almost" having nuclear weapons -- Iran today already has a freer hand to pursue its terrorist and other adventures, fairly secure in the knowledge that the punishment will never exceed what it can bear. The regime in Tehran can definitely taste the regional supremacy and impunity that await its full nuclear membership.

Israel should plan to attack Iran... QUIETLY.

Much has been made lately of Israel's open secret that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants authority from his Cabinet to attack Iran's nuclear facilities when the time is right and before Iran achieves the capacity for delivering a nuclear warhead. Israel faces many obstacles both before and after such a hypothetical attack; for starters, the one world leader who I know was once open to the idea has since been overheard calling Prime Minister Netanyahu "a liar".

All but advertising to Iran's leadership and the rest of the world that Israel is prepared to launch a military strike undermines the case for further sanctions. It bolsters Iran's warped regime domestically. Most significantly, it completely misses the point. As I blogged in November 2010, the sanctions are useful and important as part of an overall strategy to convince Iran to stop its nuclear pursuits to enhance the case for any eventual military action. But the reason to prepare for military action is not to CONVINCE Iran to stop its program. The goal of military action must be to actually STOP Iran's program. No convincing needed. 

The whole point of what would effectively be the "nuclear option" -- unleashing a violent Muslim and Arab backlash, Western sanctions against Israel, full-scale crackdown against all change agents in Iran, and more -- is to stop Iran from having or using a nuclear weapon after all else has failed. An attack on Iran is too important a decision to be reduced to a PR strategy, or a tactic for Republican victory in the U.S. elections.

To the extent that Israel's official policy of denying the existence of its own sophisticated nuclear arsenal has succeeded, it's been because it retains some sense of strategic mystery. When Ronald Reagan was President, the Soviets truly believed he might push the button, and that was a far more effective deterrent than any specific White House threat or declaration -- but in this case, an attack will not be to DETER Iran but to PREVENT it from holding or using nuclear weapons. And let's face it: In the moment of decision, the logistics and consequences of any attack against Iran's facilities may be prohibitive or even impossible.

It gets worse. 

If Iran does reach a milestone in its nuclear program and Israel does not attack, this may now be seen as weakness and a concession on Israel's part, and Netanyahu's failure to get Cabinet approval will also undermine any remaining credibility he has internationally.

The primary goal of Iran's nuclear program has always been not to destroy Israel (though that would obviously be fun for them). The goal has been to be a dominant regional power and to put Israel in its place. How better than for the world to watch Israel flinch. Six decades of fairly consistent Israeli discipline, resolve, and results-oriented fighting -- all down the drain?

Pakistan's decline is not India's rise

India must be breathing easier since the United States got Osama bin Laden right in the middle of Pakistan.

India and Pakistan cannot find enough proxies for their decades-old rivalry. Afghanistan is only the latest battleground. As has been obvious for many months, Pakistan was an active player behind the 2008 Mumbai terror spree, even though bilateral reconciliation talks have continued to sputter along. If not for the headline-grabbing nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, the arms race between India and Pakistan would be at the top of the list. And so on...

India looks better when Pakistan looks bad, whether it's for harboring the planet's number-one terrorist (who also happened to be what many Indians would call a "bloodymuslim"). Pakistan will continue to receive U.S. support because Washington needs Pakistan's help in Afghanistan and around the region, and because -- even if the Pakistanis did know for five years that Osama was living a few blocks from their elite military academy -- Pakistan is in a tight spot and probably had little choice. Or they just totally missed it, which is also believable. But like anyone else, the Indians enjoy being more popular than Pakistan, even if the decline of U.S.-Pakistan intelligence cooperation adds nothing to the U.S.-India relationship. 

Iran's latest plea for relevance, ignored.

Last week's mini-crisis in the Suez-Mediterranean involved two Iranian warships that took advantage of the Suez Canal's treaty-protected neutral access to pass through to the Mediterranean for a few days.

It was an opportunity to show the world they can do it, and also to test their crews and equipment beyond their normal coastal patrol duties. Why now, for the first time since the Islamic Revolution over 30 years ago? For one thing, if Hosni Mubarak were still in charge, he probably would have made the Iranians 'an offer they couldn't refuse,' in order to preserve his reputation for advancing strategic stability in the region. With Egyptians distracted for now, and because most of the world is distracted, the Iranians took the opportunity to rain a little on the parade of Mideast regime change that seems to have left Tehran in the dust of irrelevance. It may have also distracted Iran's own population from the agitation for regime change at home. Ironically, the real message here is that getting two vintage boats through what may be the world's most routinely used waterway was such a big deal for Iran to pull off -- ouch.

The 1956 Suez Crisis was premised upon keeping the Canal open to all shipping, as established by the Treaty of Constantinople over a century ago, so it's a bit late to start restricting access. I have little doubt that the Iranian ships were well-shadowed during their entire training run, and that they could have been boarded or sunk on a moment's notice. The only question is how many different navies were standing by for the order. And there should also be no doubt that those navies got some new insights of their own regarding Iran's long-range capacity, shipboard communication capabilities and protocols, limitations, tactics, and methods. Double ouch.

The future prospects of an Iranian naval presence in the Mediterranean have real implications for strategic planners. The transfer of weapons, offshore positioning for strikes on Israel or delivery of terror commandos, intelligence-gathering, eventual launch of crude nuclear devices at closer range -- none of this should be discounted. But the best response was probably the one we have seen: None. Triple Ouch.

Qaddafi runs out of realpolitik

It is fitting that members of Libya's UN delegation have resigned in protest against the ongoing slaughter of hundreds of protesters at the hands of Muammar Qaddafi's regime, and that the Security Council is finally convening (privately) to address the situation on the ground. In fairness, the Council first needed to go through the motions on a resolution condemning Israeli settlements, though everyone knew the United States would veto that, anyway.


All this begs the question: Why now? Qaddafi has been a ruthless dictator for four decades. Washington restored relations with Libya a few years ago, when Libya agreed to pay compensation for a string of terrorist attacks including Lockerbie (the bombing of Pan Am 103) and to abandon its dubious nuclear weapons program, while the United Kingdom has sold Libya millions in "crowd-control" equipment. 

Over the years, it's probable that Qaddafi has supported various insurgent movements across Africa, though in recent years he has supported regional security and the status quo. Just last year, however, behind closed doors, he stunned his fellow Arab leaders by going around the table assigning each a specific number of tanks and jets with which to destroy Israel.

Qaddafi has finally gone too far, even for the Security Council, even for Brazil which holds the rotating presidency of the Council this month, even for Russia, China and the other permanent Council members. Libya's now-former envoys are safe enough in New York, especially with Qaddafi's assassins probably seeking new clients.

Rather than transforming his regime, Qaddafi appealed to the international community's sense of cold realpolitik. That succeeded for a time, but now realpolitik and its incentives have swung around in his face. Isolating Qaddafi may be convenient, and it may be politic in anticipation of his opposition taking power, but it is still the proper course of action.

Why shouldn't Latin America ignore Jewish concerns?

The Israeli government and Jewish community leaders have spent most of the past two years addressing the Obama administration’s approach to Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, settlements, and Iran. For better or worse, peace talks have stalled, Washington has given up on settlements as an issue, and the Stuxnet computer worm (for better) has crippled Iran’s nuclear “research” program. While we were focused on this range of challenges, a tide of Latin American nations was moving toward pre-approval for a Palestinian state.

Why do Latin American heads of state care about meeting American Jews?

The best answer is that we are perceived to have friends in Washington. In theory, we can get those friends to help or hinder Latin American aspirations. But what incentive have American Jews provided to U.S. – or Israeli – leaders to pressure or cultivate Latin American ties? The United States will soon send a new ambassador to Venezuela, and the Jewish community had little or nothing to do with those negotiations. And Venezuela is our number-one challenge in Latin America. Every government in the region sees it does not need Jewish support to get what it wants in Washington. And now we face the consequences.

Denouncing Iran has only been useful when it led to actual votes in the United Nations Security Council or tougher enforcement of existing sanctions. The same goes for Palestinian statehood. If we truly believe that premature recognition of a Palestinian state will undermine Israel’s security and remove the incentive for direct negotiations, public campaigns will only get us so far. It’s about votes in the United Nations, not full-page ads in the New York Times.

A view from the Gulf

At the Arabs’ Table: A View from the Gulf

(A variation of this has been published in JTA and The Jerusalem Post.)

There is a conversation going on among Arab policymakers, and it’s neither all about Israel nor just Iran’s nuclear program. 

This Arab conversation is diverse and complex, counter-intuitive, on their turf, but always a two-way dialogue. One doorway into this conversation was this month's Manama Dialogue, sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and hosted warmly by the Kingdom of Bahrain. A Jewish organization with background in the Gulf and ties to the leadership in Jerusalem and Washington can contribute to this dialogue as well as draw from it.

Manama attracts key ministers from the Gulf, as well as Europe, Asia, and North America – all with a strategic interest in addressing regional security here. The unofficial nature of IISS uniquely allows for equal participation and interaction by government and military officials, policy experts, and non-governmental delegates. Where else would the Iranian Foreign Minister sit at the same table and listen to remarks by the U.S. Secretary of State.

At Friday’s opening dinner, the atmospherics were palpable. Since the center VIP table was positioned perpendicular to the dais, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was able to avoid looking at Secretary of State Hillary Clinton while during and after her speech. Quite the cool customer, he sat through her remarks and the question-and-answer without ever turning his head or displaying any expression. Most important, though, is that he did sit in that ballroom, barely 50 feet from the lectern, and four seats down from the Secretary during dinner. And he had his aides taking strenuous notes.

Stop trying to convince Iran - just focus on stopping it

Especially since this month's midterm election gains by Republicans in Congress, President Obama has been getting much public advice to make sure Iran understands that a military strike against it is a credible threat. That can't hurt, but it misses the point.

My friend Nir Boms published a new piece on Iran, showing how Iran's economy is starting to go critical. Whether by sanctions or domestic policies, Iran's decline points up an important reality about that country's illicit nuclear program (and one with which Nir may or may not agree).

As much as Americans and Israelis may hope for a military strike that miraculously takes out Iran's far-flung and dug-in facilities, this would actually be the best boost for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his clerical backers. Iranian public opinion is clearly slanted against him, which is why he had to rig last year's election. Following his crackdown on post-election demonstrators and opposition leaders, and with daily life impacted by economic misery, a "Zionist" attack would be his deus ex machina.

If Iran does get too close to achieving a dangerous nuclear capability, a military strike may be unavoidable, given the costs of inaction. In the meantime, though, the Iranian regime is unlikely to abandon the nuclear program on its own (nor will it allow open inspections). The sanctions will not convince the regime, but they are definitely depriving the regime of capital and public support.

Whether the Islamic Republic runs out of money first, or is somehow overthrown (which wouldn't by itself end Iran's nuclear program), our default strategy should be to DEPRIVE the regime of its capacity to continue, not to CONVINCE it.

Iran is not the Soviet Union, and not only because it is not a rational, predictable actor. The existential threat Soviet ICBMs once posed to the United States was two orders of magnitude above the hypothetical threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. Mutually Assured Destruction and nuclear deterrence theory are poor guides to dealing with today's Islamic Republic and its opportunistic regional ambitions.

In the end, Iran will not be deterred by the threat of a military strike, no matter how credible or severe. Iran's quest can only be denied, whether by the impact of economic weapons or by an actual military strike.

The most important mission of the military planning on Iran is to mean business, not to "look" like we mean business.

Has Obama stopped beating his Israeli wife? Or, How I learned to stop worrying and love Obama

I've just been asked whether President Obama will continue making life difficult for Israel as a result of last week’s Republican victory in the midterm elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. My first response was that it’s a bit like asking whether he’s stopped beating his wife -- how does one answer such a loaded question?

The very premise is unsubstantiated. Whatever the Israeli public thinks of Barack Obama, the fact is that his only friction with Israel has involved some personal interactions with Prime Minister Netanyahu. Aside from tactical and strategic miscalculations (or worse) over the priority of Israeli construction over the Green Line, the man has been objectively “good for Israel”. President Clinton is still highly regarded in Israel, despite his famous tarmac standoff with then-Prime Minister Netanyahu at LAX, and all sorts of arm-twisting. 

There may never be a U.S. President with as much gut feeling for Israel as George W. Bush. Yet for all his love, empathy and resolve, Israel’s diplomatic and strategic position eroded during his eight years in the White House -- even after 9/11, with the wind at his back. My point here is not to point fingers, just to point out that what Israel really needs in an American President is neither a lover nor a cheerleader, but a provider.

And just what has President Obama provided for Israel? The week after last summer’s Flotilla fiasco (not Israel’s fault, but definitely not helpful), the Obama administration went to the mat in the United Nations Security Council and extracted new sanctions against Iran -- it’s doubtful President Bush would have had the wherewithal to get any new measures past the Russian and Chinese vetoes. The President has also implemented additional unilateral measures -- or tightened the enforcement of existing rules -- against Iran’s nuclear program.

Republicans - not Russian into anything in lame-duck session

If Republicans are looking to close off foreign policy as a post-midterm political outlet for President Obama, their renewed toughness on START and other U.S.-Russia issues may be about more than long-running suspicions against the Kremlin. 


The best way to humble the Administration could be to withhold cooperation on the very issues it has identified as its own priorities. In this case, that means pouring cold water on this President's "reset" strategy, even as an enhanced bilateral relationship has begun to bear fruit for such bipartisan U.S. goals as Mideast peace talks, Iran sanctions, counter-terrorism, and civilian nuclear cooperation.


President Bush also experienced pushback on Russia ties, from some Republicans as well as Democrats, notably on his efforts to expand trade. But it's doubtful either political party would have held up the new START teaty, a reasonably straightforward replacement for the recently expired -- and demonstrably effective -- START II. 


The "123" agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation will proceed despite the partisan positioning within Congress, entering into effect this month unless somehow a deadlocked Senate adopts a Resolution of Disapproval. That's the advantage of an "agreement" over a "treaty" (which would require affirmative Senate ratification).