Death in Ankara, and beyond

There was horrible news out of Ankara today, with the brazen assassination of Russian Ambassador Andrey Karlov. Here are a few immediate thoughts:

1. Whatever war crimes are bing committed in Russia's name in Syria and Ukraine, or in cyberspace, the sanctity of diplomatic culture underpins any hope for resolving and preventing such atrocities – now and in the future.

2. Having worked closely with Russian diplomats over the past 25 years, this also hits close to home.

3. Russian President Vladimir Putin's alliance with the Orthodox Church is a primary source for his support within Russia and among other lands in the region, including Greece, Serbia, and parts of Ukraine. The ultimate prize for many of those faithful will be the former Constantinople, ancient seat of the Byzantine (Orthodox) Church. Whatever criminal motivation lay behind today's attack, the long-term battle for Turkey and for modern-day Istanbul should not be ignored.

Istanbul remains home to Hagia Sophia, the monumental cathedral converted centuries ago into a mosque and celebrated today as a landmark museum. Turkey's proximity to Syria, where Russian forces have rained death and destruction by order of magnitude since U.S. Election Day, and Turkey's vulnerability to refugee flows and Kurdish insurgents, raise the specter of Russian designs on the Orthodox prize (and of course, strategic access to the Black Sea and beyond). – Conspiratorial, for sure, but nothing is too far-fetched when it involves Kremlin.

My heart goes out to Russian friends and colleagues, even as it bleeds for the innocents being starved and slaughtered in Aleppo and other lesser known cities across Syria. Social media can often lead us astray, and my prayer today is that cooler heads will prevail on all sides.

Note: I know I've missed many items the past few months, but events were frenetic and distractions abundant. Since the U.S. election, I again have the distance and perspective to share some more developed thoughts and – hopefully – to generate some constructive discussion.

Arab Spring overplayed & underestimated

This week, as I made my way to the region, I've been following the dramatic downturn of democratic governance in Egypt. A few initial thoughts before I hear more informed  perspectives:

PEOPLE POWER

While President Morsi's Mubarak-esque combination of autocratic proclivities and astounding detachment from reality are deeply alarming, the Egyptian people are again rising up in protest. So, the biggest beneficiary and hallmark of the "Arab Spring" is proving to be More Of the Same, but the democratic spirit of the movement -- the citizens themselves -- is unabated. They still expect functional, legitimate democracy, whether from Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood or someone else. And anyway, few reputable analysts were banking on Morsi's prospects as a democratic visionary. But elections do have consequences, especially when they're held too early.

THERE IS ANOTHER

We need to excise Morsi as the face of the Arab Spring, lest his blowout come to symbolize the whole Arab Spring. If Egypt's experiment fails, this by itself does not prove the Arab Spring was a ruse or a mirage -- as some of my fellow American observers have been blogging in recent days. Owing to its size, intellectual history and strategic importance, Egypt easily took first place as the symbol of the Arab Spring. Egypt may still prove to be the big test of this sweeping movement, yet other countries are also processing their own versions. 

Tunisia, where the democratic tide started last year, is showing the kind of measured progress that Western news anchors take for granted, and thus makes for few headlines. Despite continued uncertainty, including the recent Benghazi attack that killed four Americans including the U.S. Ambassador, Libyans remain optimistic and supportive of their new democratic-trending government. 

In Bahrain, last year's protests and the ensuing crackdown were largely limited in time and scope. The grievances remain and will need to be addressed one way or another, but this is not the garden-variety Arab Spring, especially since Bahrain is sandwiched between Iran and Saudi Arabia -- two of the least democratic regimes in the region. 

Syria's Assad regime is holding fast, for now, amid popular unrest and armed rebellion. Much will depend on Bashar Assad's individual mindset: He could hold out until the end, leave town just after his kids open their Christmas presents, or start using chemical weapons against his own citizens. That third option could provide a casus belli for U.S.-NATO intervention, which will horribly escalate the violence but may also end the dictatorship and keep Iran out of the post-Assad politics.

THE KINGMAKERS

The role of non-Arab states within the Middle East will also help determine the direction of political change in the region. Iran's support for Assad and its opportunistic use of Morsi's election in Egypt have been a negative influence on the Arab Spring, and should inspire greater resolve by reformers rather than a Western retreat. Turkey, once the moderate Muslim referee, needs to regain its composure and recapture its influence with Egypt and Syria in particular. Its recent military counter-attacks on Syria, its second fiddle at Morsi's Gaza cease-fire negotiations and the angry posturing against Israel are keeping the Islamist government from realizing its potential as mediator and guarantor among its neighbors.

The Arab Spring is definitely incomplete, even dangerous in spots. But this is the Middle East, after all. And the story remains unfinished and -- in too many cases -- untold. Instead of dismissing the significance or permanence of the democratic moment, Westerners should be joining with Arabs and others to see where and why the Arab Spring is faltering, and what we can do together to facilitate real, measurable and even lasting results.

Gaza's gifts

It is intolerable for Israel's major population centers to be under attack. Ideally, Israel wants a cease-fire with Hamas, with international guarantees, or at least some outside verification, which will further elevate Israel's claims for the next time around. Israel's military offensive to neutralize the rockets and missiles being launched from Gaza against Israeli civilians also has broader and less direct implications.

ANTIDOTE TO ABBAS

As well, this is not the first time a right-wing Israeli government elevates Hamas at the expense of the more moderate PLO, now embodied in the Palestinian Authority as headed by Mahmoud Abbas. During the 1980s, Israel did not mind the ascendance of Hamas as a way of hampering the PLO's operational and political strength.

In addition to making Israelis more secure -- at least in the short term -- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reaps further political advantage by diminishing Abbas and reducing the Palestinian leader's capacity to sustain a moderate course that might eventually compel Israel to finalize territorial compromises leading to a viable Palestinian state. Such an agreement and such a state used to be an Israeli goal, but under Netanyahu these are reduced to mere rhetorical flourishes. Beyond further cutting down Abbas, the Gaza operation also distracts attention from any potential peace initiative heading into the second Obama term. These may not have been considerations in his decision to counter-attack now, but they must definitely be seen as fringe benefits.

Remembering the Struma, at 30 and 70 years

Seventy years ago, on February 24, the Struma sank with some 800 starving passengers and crew, deliberately cast adrift and probably torpedoed by a Russian or German submarine. Adding to the tragedy were the circumstances: The Struma had sailed from Constanta, Romania, with Jews escaping the Holocaust; Turkey refused them entry at Istanbul unless the British guaranteed their visas to continue on to Palestine; the ship lingered for days, then weeks, and was eventually towed back out into the Black Sea. Horrible. Unnecessary.

Thirty years after the Struma sank, we spent a long summer in Bucharest, getting to know the brutality of Communism -- and the daily luxuries of the Diplomatic Club -- firsthand. We also spent some wonderful days along the Black Sea resorts, including Constanta -- not yet aware of the dark association with the Struma. The closest friends we made there were Millie and Otto, who were spared the concentration camps of World War II, though Otto had endured the Russian Front and together they faced the darkest of Ceausescu's Marxist fantasies. As a young woman, before the war, Millie had managed to spend a year in the States, so her English was excellent and her regrets consuming.

I gradually absorbed Millie's story, over successive visits to Romania, as I grew old enough to comprehend. During the war, she was working for the telephone exchange and had saved enough money so that -- when one of her sisters booked passage aboard the Struma with her husband -- Millie was able to pay the fare for a younger sister to join them, presumably heading to safety. Later, as the ship sat in quarantine off of Istanbul, the husband's international firm was able to pull some strings and get landing cards for the married couple -- but not for Millie's second sister. All three stayed together aboard the Struma, and all three perished.

Turkey, the crazy old man of Europe

Not so long ago, at Davos, seated beside United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan picked a very personal and undiplomatic argument with Israeli President Shimon Peres before storming off the stage (The video is astounding). Shortly after that, he headlined a hate-filled anti-Israel rally back at home. He also appeared at a rally in Ankara where at some point a giant banner was unfurled depicting Peres bowing before Erdogan.

It didn't help matters that some senior Israeli diplomats who definitely knew better set up Turkey's ambassador for a calculated, unprofessional, televised hazing over some minor pretext for what was still a very valuable account.

In March 2010, Turkey's new Ambassador to the United States was temporarily recalled following a non-binding (but taboo) "Armenian Genocide" resolution that was approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, but never even made it to the full House of Representatives, let alone inform U.S. policy.

The May 2010 Gaza Flotilla incident is well known, if disputed. Despite a United Nations finding that Israel deserves only partial blame for the deaths of nine violent, mostly Turkish blockade runners, Erdogan continues to demand a formal and unambiguous apology from the Israeli government.

Curiously, Erdogan expelled Israel's ambassador only AFTER the UN inquiry issued its report. Now he demands Israel end its embargo of Gaza, even though the UN findings supported Israel's right to enforce the weapons blockade.

The Israeli UN speech that can't

At the United Nations, Israel seems destined to continue squandering its starring role on the global stage, only to play to the hometown audience. Last time around, it was Holocaust heartstrings, and this week it will be Palestinian politics. And beyond squandering, it's actually undermining Israel's diplomatic and political interests. 

HOLOCAUST

Two years ago, when Prime Minister Netanyahu last represented Israel at the annual opening of the United Nations General Assembly, he used his speech to defend the historical record of the Holocaust in the face of denials by the Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Ironically, Ahmadinejad omitted that very libel from his own UNGA remarks, so the only one that week to highlight doubts about the Holocaust was the Prime Minister of Israel. 

This whole exercise came four years AFTER the UN had finally begun recognizing and institutionalizing the scale, lessons and implications of the Holocaust, and the UNGA had already adopted a resolution condemning denial of the Holocaust -- with Iran implicitly the target. And in a perverse twist, just weeks earlier, Netanyahu's political allies in Israel and the United States had blasted President Obama for lecturing the Muslim world about the intimate connection between the Holocaust and the founding of the Jewish State, as though Obama were reducing Israel to just a Holocaust metaphor. Then the same critics turned around and praised Netanyahu for essentially doing the same thing.

To a world that had recently committed itself to the inadmissibility of Holocaust denial, Netanyahu validated the naysayers by literally waving documentary evidence in their faces. Israelis loved it, but it was neither relevant nor timely. 

PALESTINE

This week, Netanyahu returns in person, after letting his Foreign Minister address the UNGA last year on the merits of population transfer. What will the Prime Minister stress? The injustice of recognizing a new Palestinian state at this time.

Leaving aside whether it is unjust and/or unwise for the Palestinians, Israel is itself a sovereign country, with much more to offer the world than a stand against Palestinian self-determination. So is this really what the Prime Minister wants to put front and center as Israel's annual message to the assembled world leaders? Apparently so.

Israel faces bigger threats than "Palestine"

I often hear observers lament that one party or other in a dispute is getting all worked up over a "symbol". The sad fact is, many wars have been fought over symbols, because symbols are usually important on both sides of a conflict.

Losing the United Nations vote on recognizing a Palestinian "UDI" (unilateral declaration of independence) is not Israel's biggest challenge right now.

Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iran...

Israel seems to have fewer friends and fewer stable neighbors -- and more dangerous neighbors -- than it did a year ago.

Choosing peacemakers over war-mongers

The other day, I heard a random rumor that Bahrain was working some initiative to restart Israeli-Palestinian peace talks (remember those days?). Whether the rumor is true or not, and setting aside the recent concerns about democracy and human rights issues, it didn't shock me -- and it highlights a useful dividing line between productive governments and destructive regimes. Certainly, there are democracies and "good" autocracies that also go to war to save popular standing, but very few "bad" dictatorships have ever made peace in order to quell a popular revolt.

When Richard Nixon was besieged by Watergate at home, he accelerated his efforts -- and Henry Kissinger's -- to end hostilities in the Middle East, setting the stage for the subsequent Camp David talks. When Ehud Olmert was being accused of corruption, he recommitted himself to negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas. For all the concerns we may have about the circumstances, these actions reflect a healthy society, where a leader can assume that promoting international reconciliation wins domestic support (or at least distracts from personal troubles). 

Countries whose leaders have no respect for the governed adopt wholesale repression against their own people and have no hesitation to pick fights and project external enemies as the real villains. In the case of Syria, President Bashar Assad has fanned tensions with Israel and with Turkey even as his regime faces a massive popular uprising. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded to widespread protests against his dubious re-election by turning up his defiance of the international community. When there is no proactive program for growth and innovation, the preferred option seems to be polarization and fear. 

Even as we advocate for rule of law and civil liberties around the world, it is worth bearing in mind that some governments are at least leaning in our direction, while others have no intention and make no pretense of ever being true to their citizens or forthright with the world.

Why the Syrians are on their own

I was asked why the world is not taking more action in support of the popular uprising and basic human rights being threatened in Syria. By rights, the major powers should have stepped in the way they did in Libya, or at least call on Bashar Assad to step down (or at least revoke his medical license for systematically savaging a poor 13-year-old boy).

Here are a few thoughts:

1. Why now? Just because of what's been going on elsewhere in the region? The Assad family has put down localized uprisings before. Most Syrians may either hate the Assad regime or simply want democracy (or something else), but most people don't seem to be taking to the streets. Syria has been a brutal place for decades.

2. Everyone but the brave protesters seems to prefer Syria as it is. Even though Egypt is strategically vital, its territorial integrity was never up for grabs, while Syria -- a bit like Iraq -- has remained a precarious venture. Syria could disintegrate, in which case the region might plunge into violent anarchy.

3. So many powers are invested in Syria's status quo, moreso perhaps than with Egypt. Russia and France still retain old colonial designs on Lebanon and Syria's national life. The United States, obviously, has interests relating to Lebanon, Israel, and Iran. Though they be allies on generally good terms, Iran might use Assad's downfall to expand its role in shaping Syrian politics even more than in Lebanon, and to further streamline its pipeline of terrorists and weapons into Lebanon. Turkey fancies itself as the bridge between Europe and the Middle East, and it shares Kurd-a-phobia with Assad. 

4. Israel, of course, has relied upon its contentious yet predictable border, including Lebanon. It already lost one longtime neighbor in Hosni Mubarak, but at least there's a peace treaty locked in with U.S. financial and strategic support. Syria has no emergency brake. And if Israel ever did cut a deal with Syria, it could be a relatively straight -- if painful -- swap of Golan Heights for peace; but not if Iran steps in first.

The Syrian people have long deserved better than Bashar Assad, but they also know their predicament. Their resilience is impressive, and we can hope they succeed and that their rich intellectual and cultural heritage carries them through toward a more democratic future. But the vested interests will be vested, at least for now.

Why Israel can still rely on U.S. support at the UN

Why am I not worried about a possible vote tomorrow in the UN Security Council on a resolution condemning Israeli settlement activity?

First of all, I don't happen to think new settlement activity is worth all the trouble (unless the goal is to close off any future peace deal), but I don't see how Washington does better messaging Israel through the Security Council than by hitting speed dial on 1,000 U.S. Government cell phones.

I am not worried about the United States letting the resolution get adopted by withholding its veto as one of the five permanent members of the Council. Despite all the speculation and hyped fueled by progressive foreign policy wonks and further leveraged by conservative critics of most of the Obama administration's global agenda, the USG has displayed no signs that it will let the resolution go through. Quite the contrary.

Without breaching protocol by broadcasting that it will definitely veto the resolution, U.S. officials have said everything but.

It was reported late yesterday that U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice had floated a proposal to the UN's Arab bloc for a toned-down Presidential Statement (issued by the Council Presidency by consensus of all 15 members) reaffirming the Council's opposition to settlements, etc., and condemning rocket attacks from Gaza against Israelis. There were a few minor concessions from the U.S. side, as well. Despite some of the conclusions of the press report, this did not constitute some radical departure from U.S. practice.

The Arabs rejected the U.S. proposal, for the same reason the U.S. offered it. They don't care whether the Council issues anything, be it a full-fledged resolution or a less formal statement. They care about forcing the United States to veto a tactical resolution now so we'll have less credibility later on when a vote on Palestinian statehood comes before the Council. And we care about avoiding any unnecessary vetoes along the way, which is why Ambassador Rice's proffer made sense when I read of it.

As Egypt hits critical mass, what is Israel thinking? Or not.

It is ironic that a Jewish State cannot bear to see the writing on the wall. Amid U.S. concern that 40 years of support for the Sadat and Mubarak regimes may compromise Washington’s influence in the new Egypt, reports that Israel is CURRENTLY lobbying Western powers to keep Hosni Mubarak in power are astounding. 

In the final hours (or months) of the Mubarak regime, and with a good chance that the army and/or a broad coalition government will emerge, it seems unwise for Israel to draw further negative attention to itself. Worse, after selling itself as “the only democracy in the Middle East” since forever, Israel chooses THIS MOMENT to rebrand itself to the world as realpolitik over democracy? 

Is there anything to be gained by this awkward approach? Will France and Britain suddenly bolster Mubarak out of concern for Israel's sensibilities? One might almost think Israel's career diplomats were still on strike...

Israelis may be worried about an Islamist takeover in Egypt, having just gained one Islamist government to their north, in Lebanon. What happened in Beirut earlier this month -- a Hezbollah-controlled government has taken power -- was the result of a long-running and long-expected political transformation, not a sudden surge of popular support.

There are no ultimate guarantees in any peace process. Some scholars, like Daniel Pipes, have insisted that Israel should not make agreements with Arab states until they become democratic. Only a democracy, presumably, can be relied upon to honor a treaty of peace, because a dictatorship is liable to be overthrown. Essentially, this is an argument against Israel ever making peace with its neighbors, even if it's the state of war that helps those dictators hold on to absolute power (see under: Syria).