R.I.P., Ariel Sharon - Israel's last visionary leader?

Ariel Sharon's passing is opening a flood of memories back to 1973, including a time when it seemed Israel had options, because its leaders were willing to think big and take risks - and not just for peace. That spirit, which Sharon embodied, still abounds among Israelis, but it seems to me (granted, from a distance) that it's been a while (say, eight years) since the leaders have channeled it. Sharon was the last of that breed.

(Israeli President Shimon Peres is a master visionary, but he serves in a figurehead capacity and will be retiring at the end of his current term.)

I remember, over a span of mere months, from July 1976 to early 1977, Israel liberated the Entebbe hostages and Maccabi Tel-Aviv defeated the Soviet Red Army basketball team, on its way to winning the European cup - a defining moment. 

Menachem Begin's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor was a bold stroke, and even the ill-fated 1982 invasion of Lebanon was audacious. As Defense Minister, Sharon had sought to decapitate the PLO in exile, in the hope that local West Bank leaders would somehow emerge to negotiate Palestinian acquiescence to permanent Israeli control.

There were subsequent moments as well, including Anwar Sadat's dramatic 1978 visit to Jerusalem, at the behest of Menachem Begin which culminated in the Camp David talks and the 1979 peace treaty, and of course Oslo in 1993 and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, led by Yitzhak Rabin. For anyone who remembers 1973, it's still difficult to absorb how much changed in just five years' time.

Sharon, like Rabin before him, was a general whose strategic vision eventually applied itself to securing Israel's survival off the battlefield and far into the future.

Improbably, especially in light of 1982, Sharon reclaimed the activist's mantle just a decade ago, as Prime Minister. He saw that Gaza was lost as an Israeli stronghold, a small piece of beach with well over one million Palestinians. Back then, the half-hearted U.S. peace efforts were actually lagging behind the Israelis and Palestinians, and besides, Sharon didn't see Mahmoud Abbas being able to deliver his side of a bilateral agreement. As Rabin did before him, Sharon realized that - if Israelis and Palestinians can't live together peacefully, then it's better to live separately, beginning with Gaza.

Around Sharon's funeral, numerous and interlocking calculations were being made. The official statements from the White House and State Department seemed careful not to underplay Sharon's significance, as a positive message to Israel's current Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, nor to shower so much praise that Netanyahu feels slighted by contrast. In his eulogy at the funeral, Netanyahu replayed his own mantras about the Holocaust and Iran. U.S. Vice President Biden, leading the U.S. delegation, extolled Sharon's bravery in evacuating Gaza and reiterated President Obama's unwavering commitment to the U.S.-Israel alliance.

In itself, the fact that Biden was there, eight years after Sharon left the scene under a massive stroke, underscored the abiding value and honor Washington attaches to Israeli leaders who are willing to take control of their destiny. At the end, it was Sharon's private secretary and a war buddy who evoked his personal tenderness and devotion in a way that truly transcended official protocol and convention. 

My biggest regret today was the ring of truth to Biden's closing quote from Shakespeare: We "shall not look upon his like again."

Iran's sense of vulnerability casts a wide net

The Gulf expects more from the United States, and less from Iran. Surprised?

On the military side, admirals and generals want to know our plans and protocols for managing the threat from Iran, on tactical as well as strategic levels. Politically, diplomats and bloggers alike blame us for letting Mubarak fall in favor of the new Islamist Pharaoh, Mohamed Morsi. On Syria, opinion is divided on whether the United States ought to directly intervene militarily or simply provide advanced weapons to the rebels. But then maybe, judging from the current blowback on Morsi and his ascendant Muslim Brotherhood, we should be stepping in to prop up Syrian President Bashar Assad... Stability vs. democracy, or secular vs. religious autocracy.

Reflecting the outdated relevance of Wikileaks, Gulf regimes are no longer itching for a U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Instead, they are acutely aware that if Iran gets lucky with just one anti-ship mine, all oil shipments will come to a standstill. The closer Iran gets to achieving "breakout" capacity, or to crossing one of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's ever-shifting "red lines", the more regional leaders understand that neither diplomatic nor military options promise an easy resolution. And once again, regardless of the nuclear file, Iran's ongoing opportunism is evident in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and potentially Bahrain. The regime in Tehran is as happy to take advantage of popular Arab unrest as it was to seize full control of Abu Musa from the United Arab Emirates 20 years ago (or to regain its former sovereignty, according to the Iranians).

For all their defiance and bluster, Iranians remain concerned about their own rights to security and national self-defense: The entire punitive premise of international nuclear negotiators and the sanctions backing them up leaves Iranians feeling humiliated and cornered. This is not merely posturing -- it's a genuine feeling.

I do not discount Iran's violation of international treaties and conventions on the transparency and verifiability of its nuclear program, nor its propensity to support terrorism and undermine diplomatic solutions, especially where the Israelis and Palestinians are concerned. Sure, Iran is responsible for its current dilemma. But so long as Iran feels deep down that its very sovereignty and survival are being threatened, it is unlikely to willingly give up what has become its nuclear insurance policy.

While the West cannot afford to back down, it is increasingly likely that Iran will nevertheless succeed in attaining nuclear weapons capacity within the next five years. Leveraging the existing and future sanctions and other measures, it may be possible to fashion a process and terms of reference that acknowledge and allay Iranian fears and also establish a framework for taking the centrifuges off line.

An Iran that WANTS to own nuclear weapons can potentially be deterred. An Iran that feels it NEEDS to own nuclear weapons will be truly dangerous and unpredictable. If our efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran are able to address both points, we just might succeed in the short term and also open the door to a long-term process of normalization.

Israel shouldn't risk for peace? So say so

Those who don't want peace will never have a shortage of statistics and anecdotes to cite in support of their rejectionism. Israel's most vocal antagonists appear politically primitive, often tribal in their allegiances, fractious, racist, absolutist, and wantonly violent. Those who reject meaningful negotiations against such a backdrop feel justified in not taking the risk. But every choice carries a risk, and continuing along the same path day after day -- and settlement after settlement, unpleasant necessity after... is equally a choice, and with real risks. Own it.

My Republican friends like to talk about being responsible for one's choices, so OK. If the "facts on the ground" are so challenging and dispiriting -- and if one is unwilling to recognize even minor blame on Israel's side -- then opponents of the peace process should be clear about their position: There should be no negotiations. Israel's current government has not been clear, at least not in English and not to Washington. The good news for the wide spectrum of Israelis who have come back around to opposing or fearing any negotiations with the Palestinians, is that many months ago U.S. President Obama gave up on any serious effort to bring Israeli and Palestinian leaders back to the table.

Israel faces bigger threats than "Palestine"

I often hear observers lament that one party or other in a dispute is getting all worked up over a "symbol". The sad fact is, many wars have been fought over symbols, because symbols are usually important on both sides of a conflict.

Losing the United Nations vote on recognizing a Palestinian "UDI" (unilateral declaration of independence) is not Israel's biggest challenge right now.

Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iran...

Israel seems to have fewer friends and fewer stable neighbors -- and more dangerous neighbors -- than it did a year ago.

Why the Syrians are on their own

I was asked why the world is not taking more action in support of the popular uprising and basic human rights being threatened in Syria. By rights, the major powers should have stepped in the way they did in Libya, or at least call on Bashar Assad to step down (or at least revoke his medical license for systematically savaging a poor 13-year-old boy).

Here are a few thoughts:

1. Why now? Just because of what's been going on elsewhere in the region? The Assad family has put down localized uprisings before. Most Syrians may either hate the Assad regime or simply want democracy (or something else), but most people don't seem to be taking to the streets. Syria has been a brutal place for decades.

2. Everyone but the brave protesters seems to prefer Syria as it is. Even though Egypt is strategically vital, its territorial integrity was never up for grabs, while Syria -- a bit like Iraq -- has remained a precarious venture. Syria could disintegrate, in which case the region might plunge into violent anarchy.

3. So many powers are invested in Syria's status quo, moreso perhaps than with Egypt. Russia and France still retain old colonial designs on Lebanon and Syria's national life. The United States, obviously, has interests relating to Lebanon, Israel, and Iran. Though they be allies on generally good terms, Iran might use Assad's downfall to expand its role in shaping Syrian politics even more than in Lebanon, and to further streamline its pipeline of terrorists and weapons into Lebanon. Turkey fancies itself as the bridge between Europe and the Middle East, and it shares Kurd-a-phobia with Assad. 

4. Israel, of course, has relied upon its contentious yet predictable border, including Lebanon. It already lost one longtime neighbor in Hosni Mubarak, but at least there's a peace treaty locked in with U.S. financial and strategic support. Syria has no emergency brake. And if Israel ever did cut a deal with Syria, it could be a relatively straight -- if painful -- swap of Golan Heights for peace; but not if Iran steps in first.

The Syrian people have long deserved better than Bashar Assad, but they also know their predicament. Their resilience is impressive, and we can hope they succeed and that their rich intellectual and cultural heritage carries them through toward a more democratic future. But the vested interests will be vested, at least for now.

Has Israel given up on history?

The New York Times Sunday Magazine has an informative look at how far Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas had progressed toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, before Olmert stepped down as Israel's Prime Minister under a cloud of financial allegations. Since the Egyptian uprising started gaining steam two weeks ago, various voices -- including Olmert -- have insisted that now is the time to push forward with the Palestinians, instead of hunkering down. I happen to agree on a wishful, geopolitical level, but practically this cannot happen.

First, the reasoning for taking a break: The revolution/coup in Egypt underscores the ephemeral nature of any peace agreement with either a dictatorship or an Islamist-influenced Arab state, including the Palestinians -- in other words, no existing or future Arab state is presumed to be a reliable partner. That's quite a prison term for an isolated Israel. And it's a caricature of the reality, where Israel has used a 30-year respite from existential threats (Iran's someday nuclear weapons notwithstanding) to absorb one million post-Soviet immigrants and occupy the top tier of high-tech industry and economics.

Next, the reasoning for pushing forward now: It's precisely the negative potential for any changes that makes it urgent to push for peace now, while Abbas (and Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad) still retains some control of the situation. Because Sadat committed Egypt to the binding peace treaty in 1979, and the United States committed to bankrolling both the Israeli and Egyptian concessions in effective perpetuity, no Egyptian government can ever afford to abrogate the legal arrangement. If Egypt's military rulers ever hand over power to a democratically elected government, it's unlikely that such a coalition would be inclined or focused enough to agree to such a deal today. And the absence of Mubarak as a regional broker makes it less likely that both sides can bridge the remaining gaps, or that Hamas will ever sign on.

Now, why this won't work: Benjamin Netanyahu, the current Prime Minister of Israel, has proven by his actions that he is less interested in a final arrangement with Palestinians than with postponing any day of reckoning for as long as possible. U.S. President Barack Obama might have used Mubarak's resignation as an opportunity to yank Netanyahu forward, but he already gambled his political capital on a settlement freeze -- twice -- and now Netanyahu's Republican allies on Capitol Hill have the White House playing defense on domestic issues.

Mideast revolutions, one at a time

Visiting Romania in the 1970s and '80s, it was impossible to understand how one sector of the population could completely stifle all dissent and resistance. But it was equally inconceivable that someday the people would rise up, and the dictator would be subject to their swift justice. Then suddenly, one day it happened.

Recent events across the Middle East defy easy explanation. As I pointed out a couple of weeks ago, no single empire or coordinated ideology is holding back Arab and Middle East nations -- not Ottomans, French, British, Communists, mullahs. Each country has its own unique set of circumstances and personalities, its own culture and identity. There is no unified tsunami of freedom sweeping the region, but there was obvious inspiration from Tunisia, reinforced by widespread solidarity with Egyptians. The stronger, indirect impact of events is already being felt in the Mideast peace process, between the rival Palestinian factions, and among leaders in the region.

Last year's post-election demonstrations in Iran clearly had some influence on Tunisians, and perhaps some of the Wikileaks cables did as well. There was no way to predict when (or even if) the Ben-Ali regime would fall, precisely because it appears to have been spontaneous -- the right martyr, at the right time, with the right combination of popular forces. Many Egyptians were already anticipating a showdown next September, when Mubarak was expected to let his son succeed him through the usual fixed election, and then Tunisia happened.

Beyond Egypt, the Hashemites in Jordan have survived far worse than last week's demonstrations, and King Abdullah retains the loyalty of the military and key tribes -- and without 50 million hungry mouths to feed. In Yemen, President Saleh hastened to announce his retirement in another two years -- anyway, Yemen has already been suffering from an insurgency and civil war, so revolution will have to take a number. The Gulf states are too wealthy, with too few people, to invite much "revolution", and palace coups happen on their own timetable. 

Iran's nuclear threat distracts us from daily dangers

The intelligence dance on Iran continues. Last week, Israel's outgoing Mossad chief pushed back the projected date of Iran’s nuclear debut to 2015. The most recent assessment had been a year or less, but presumably the Stuxnet computer worm and a couple of well-placed motorcycle bombs have set things back a bit. 

But... 2015?

For years now, U.S. and Israeli intelligence estimates on Iran's nuclear program have alternated between imminent threat and distant possibility, just over the horizon. Part of this may reflect an honest assessment of technical, strategic and military capabilities and intentions.

Political calculations also factor into such back and forth. If "sanctions fatigue" begins to undermine support for new sanctions or enforcement of existing measures, because the assumption is Iran already has a nuclear capability or it's inevitable, then projections can be changed to show there's still time to act. If the nuclear threshold seems too distant and inconsequential, data can be repackaged to suggest greater urgency and emphasize ongoing progress.

A view from the Gulf

At the Arabs’ Table: A View from the Gulf

(A variation of this has been published in JTA and The Jerusalem Post.)

There is a conversation going on among Arab policymakers, and it’s neither all about Israel nor just Iran’s nuclear program. 

This Arab conversation is diverse and complex, counter-intuitive, on their turf, but always a two-way dialogue. One doorway into this conversation was this month's Manama Dialogue, sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and hosted warmly by the Kingdom of Bahrain. A Jewish organization with background in the Gulf and ties to the leadership in Jerusalem and Washington can contribute to this dialogue as well as draw from it.

Manama attracts key ministers from the Gulf, as well as Europe, Asia, and North America – all with a strategic interest in addressing regional security here. The unofficial nature of IISS uniquely allows for equal participation and interaction by government and military officials, policy experts, and non-governmental delegates. Where else would the Iranian Foreign Minister sit at the same table and listen to remarks by the U.S. Secretary of State.

At Friday’s opening dinner, the atmospherics were palpable. Since the center VIP table was positioned perpendicular to the dais, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was able to avoid looking at Secretary of State Hillary Clinton while during and after her speech. Quite the cool customer, he sat through her remarks and the question-and-answer without ever turning his head or displaying any expression. Most important, though, is that he did sit in that ballroom, barely 50 feet from the lectern, and four seats down from the Secretary during dinner. And he had his aides taking strenuous notes.