Israel at 75 is up to us

“When Israel has prostitutes and thieves, we’ll be a state just like any other," was David Ben-Gurion's famous line about achieving a true place among the nations. Decades later, a few of us joined Ben-Gurion's late protege -- and our own beloved mentor -- Ralph Goldman to visit the Tel Aviv home of Israel's first and greatest Prime Minister. Ralph showed us the small kitchen table where BG would read and drink his coffee, and the sink where he'd wash out his own cup when he was finished. Imagine, the founder of modern Israel washing out his own coffee cup...

Fast-forward to today, as Israel celebrates its 75th anniversary. It has fulfilled so much Biblical prophecy, including the ingathering of exiles and shining a light unto the nations in countless dimensions. Israel has a first-rate military and economy, it has top-ranked arts and sciences, and its legitimacy is now almost universally accepted. It's also been home to its share of prostitutes and thieves, and tonight its Prime Minister is known for the kind of extravagant high living that Ben-Gurion wouldn't even have recognized.

 
Benjamin Netanyahu has also assembled a governing coalition that seems hell-bent on erasing the values and political culture to which all the founders including the right-wingers had pledged themselves. His top priority is revoking the independence of the judiciary even as convicted criminals and terror suspects serve in his government and as he himself is on trial for public corruption.

Israel was far from perfect before, and now it certainly faces the greatest challenge to the rule of law in its history. But is it so different from the United States of Trump, Orban's Hungary, Bolsonaro's Brazil, or Berlusconi's Italy? All these leaders and their movements have collaborated together and been extolled by the same MAGA strategists and cheered on by Vladimir Putin. And all these countries remain vibrant societies vigorously debating their identities and futures.

In this century, no major Israeli party has run an election on the Palestinian issue, while Netanyahu has done his best to exacerbate, sideline and leverage it for his own political purposes. Now, belatedly, the Israeli left seems to be connecting some of the dots between occupation, mob vengeance, and rule of law. We'll have to see if it's too late.

So these are the stakes.

Around the world, democracy and decency are on the ballot, and even when they win the results are challenged and denied. Yes, Israel is part of this seamy dynamic. The murderous Saudi crown prince cuts business deals with Netanyahu and with Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner, and Sudan's military junta is only too happy to be courted by the Jewish state amid the gun battles of Khartoum. But millions of Israelis have also taken to the streets, and this week even the loyalist American Jewish Federations are considered in play, with Netanyahu declining to show up for the ultimate Israel-Diaspora victory lap.

From that sunny day in 1970 when our ship first pulled into Haifa port, Israel has been part of me. Not as an American Zionist theme park, but as a true homeland with real people and real challenges, and one worth fighting for.

I have hope for Israel's future, and I believe deeply in its religious and prophetic significance. My critiques of Netanyahu et al these past 15 years have certainly cost me professionally and socially, but my intent was always to avert just such a crisis as we see now.

Tonight, after remembering the fallen, I will be celebrating the existence of Israel, the spirit of Israelis, and the aspiration to continue and perfect this sacred and historic undertaking, and never to take its existence or its democracy for granted. Even when it hurts.

IN BRIEF: With or without annexation, permanent damage has already been done

There's plenty of good analysis on how annexation will be wrong and dangerous, along with much speculation on whether Netanyahu will or won't do it, when, and how much.

MY FOCUS: The permanent damage that's already been caused.

Do US Jews value pluralism over justice?

I am outraged by Israel's long years of bait-and-switch with Judaism's non-Orthodox denominations, most of whom fervently support and advocate for the Jewish state, culminating in the latest decision to abandon even a compromise of their basic religious rights. This last straw in a long-running scam to exclude and demonize non-Orthodox Jews should rattle us all to our core.

Equally striking, however, is the general contrast between our community's instant and very public outrage over this spiritual and emotional offense, which targets mostly absentee co-religionists who otherwise enjoy freedom of travel and self-expression vs. the daily and hourly humiliation and subjugation of 2+ million Palestinians -- whose plight, regardless of who is at fault, is at least somewhat and significantly in the hands of the same Israeli government which has now again inconvenienced and insulted Conservative, Reform and Reconstructionist Jews. 

Unless as a throwaway line with which to blame "the Arabs" and excuse Israel, even mentioning the Palestinians' situation commonly engenders charges of anti-Semitism and perfidy hurled reflexively by Federation leaders, pulpit rabbis, radio hosts, and blog idols of the official pro-Israel line. Speakers are disinvited, academic tenures are threatened. 

The American Jewish Diaspora won't dare notice -- and actively distracts from the reality -- that Palestinians are routinely and daily denied basic human dignity, rights and services, except to blame and denigrate the Palestinians themselves. Yet, for over three decades, to have one integral but single right -- the right to non-Orthodox observance, including "Who is a Jew" -- denied them in the land of our forefathers is an existential crisis demanding urgent moral umbrage.

In most cases, the same American Jewish establishment which once again warns vocally and righteously of the specter of an alienated American Jewry still thinks little of the Palestinians who live within sight of the Western Wall. As a community, we staunchly defend the Israeli Government's actions with regard to the basic rights of Palestinians, then we turn around and expect that same government to show remorse for how it allows us to pray and validate conversions. 

If this is the Light Unto the Nations, then which nations do we mean? And if we cannot even bear to hear the prayers and grievances of those under our immediate or indirect control, then how can we expect God to hear our own entreaties at the site of his Holy Temple?

Bernie-Come-Lately does no favors for Mideast peace

Bernie Sanders' recent missteps on Israel and Gaza are disturbing for a few reasons.

First, he was asked about the topic because he's repeatedly mentioned his concerns about Israeli policies and use of force. A serious politician would have known the difference between 10,000 killed and 10,000 injured Palestinians, and a principled politician would have accepted being corrected (after literally asking for it) -- yet Senator Sanders then countered it was even more than 10,000, and implied they were all innocent. 

On other occasions, I've expressed my own concerns about Israeli actions, including in Gaza. Sen. Sanders is the most visible critic of such policies, and by implication he's the test case for a progressive solution to the Palestinian issue. The fact that he pushes so hard on Israel's buttons without even a sense of the scale of the conflict undermines the credibility for the rest of us, who really put ourselves on the line with friends and the powers that be.

On a more personal note, I've been seeing the relentless defensive tactics of Sen. Sanders and his apologists, most directly (and also directed at me) on social media. This includes questioning my sophistication, challenging my motivations, misrepresenting my arguments, and dismissing the relevance or significance of The Bern's inaccurate, self-righteous and counter-productive complaint against Israel. I've been accused of being an AIPAC stooge and not caring about Palestinian lives, all because I refuse to be satisfied with the Sanders retort that the number wasn’t what’s important…

Accountability, it seems, is only to be demanded of those remaining outside the Sanders camp. The left-wing peace movement is rallying behind him, especially on this point, which unfortunately suggests that -- like Sen. Sanders -- these groups are more interested in scoring points with their home base rather than with convincing anyone else, or with effecting substantive change over the long haul. 

Not that I'm shocked by any of this, but it would have been nice to see some statesmanship.

You say 'Chamas' and I say 'Hamas'...why it matters

Language and politics have always been linked, and today there remain many examples, no less in the Middle East and the War on Terror.

Peter Beinart recently asked why Israelis insist on pronouncing Hamas using the Hebrew "chet" sound, approximated by the Spanish "J", as in Guadalajara, or the "ch" in bleccchhhh. In Arabic, "Hamas" is spelled and pronounced with the more challenging throatiness of the letter 'Haa. The Hebrew Chet is still pronounced that way by some Jews of Mideastern origin, but standardization of modern Hebrew has largely eliminated that. So, there's one easy explanation. 

On a more complicated level, though, this also fits an Israeli and Western optic, where "we" get to define others on our terms. Hence, some of my colleagues in the pro-Israel community still use the antiquated "Moslem" to refer to Muslims, akin to calling Beijing by its erstwhile, anglicized form of Peking. Like the duck. 

When I see someone of this century referring to "Moslems", I immediately sense a lack of understanding or sympathy for a religion and culture of one billion souls, spanning dozens of countries. It's almost as quaint as Thomas Jefferson's vintage reference to "Mussulmans". Unlike "Hamas", the Arabic "Muslim" easily lends itself to correct pronunciation by English-speakers. At least, for those who care.

Saying "Hamas" with a simple English-style hard "H" sounds more accurate, since it leaves out the guttural -- and completely wrong -- "kh" as in Guadalajara. Knowingly or not, pronouncing "Hamas" as a modern Hebrew term, rather than the Arabic of its origin, takes ownership of that group's narrative. It really displaces the broader Palestinian narrative, as well. In fact, most Israelis still refer to Palestinians who are Israeli citizens as "Israeli Arabs".

When pro-Israel activists in the States hear an Israeli expert refer to "Chamas" (or "Khamas"), they may assign more authority to the analysis and arguments, since few Americans can pronounce that sound, either. Of course, that same word in Hebrew, with the Chet, translates as criminal violence, so there's also that.

We are admonished to call evil by its name, but if we insist on pronouncing it our own way, how does that help the fight? The world, and sometimes our own neighbors, don't operate according to our fears and expectations.

Questions for Congress on Mideast peace

As usual, Congress is full of complaints, questions and demands -- especially regarding the Middle East peace process. Here are some questions Congress might try to answer this week:

1. How would Congress resolve the paradox of Palestinian representation? Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections, expedited with U.S. support, making it the rightful representative of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli leaders, especially Prime Minister Netanyahu, have repeatedly questioned Abbas’ legitimacy by pointing out that – even on a good day – he speaks for only half the Palestinians. If he is somehow able to cobble together a functional joint effort with Hamas support (if not outright “participation”) and/or if Hamas improbably accepts the conditions of the Mideast Quartet (the PA must recognize Israel, renounce terrorism, and accept all prior agreements), Israel might truly have the credible negotiating partner it has long sought. Until September 1993, Israel banned all contact with the PLO, seen as a terrorist organization.

2. If a final resolution is vital to Israel’s long-term security and stability, how far will Congress go to back an Administration that’s seeking a workable outcome? Netanyahu, Abbas and most Members of Congress are publicly committed to achieving a two-state solution, using the 1949 Green Line (a.k.a. “’67 lines”) as a starting point for negotiations. Other terms are fairly well known, as are sticking points like the status of Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem, and the final borders of Israel and a Palestinian state

3. Can Congress develop creative channels for supporting programs, possibly outside the official scope of the PA, in order to keep efforts moving on the ground?

4. Is Congress committed to legitimizing risk-takers for peace in the Middle East? Will Congress convene hearings on functional strategies toward peace, to flesh out and publicly empower change agents and those taking risks for peace? It should be possible to do so without undermining Israel’s interest, especially since such endeavors enhance Israel’s standing.

If Israel has a Plan B, let's hear it.

Many Israelis seem pleased that the second shoe has now dropped on the unlikely U.S.-led effort to bridge old and new gaps between Israelis and Palestinians. Now, Israeli Economy Minister Naftali Bennett has even mocked Mahmoud Abbas' threat to dissolve the Palestinian Authority. 

If the leaders of Israel's governing coalition truly appreciated the degree to which a credible and sustainable Palestinian entity is in their national interest, as they often acknowledge at least rhetorically, they might be less triumphant and superior at this moment, or at any moment. And they would be more concerned with how to bolster Abbas, rather than forcing Washington to drag them kicking and screaming at each turn.

Whatever positive steps Israel has taken of late, much energy has also been spent in ways that obviously undermine Abbas and boost his Hamas rivals. Over the past few years, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has continued expansion and proliferation of West Bank settlements, even into areas generally accepted as part of a future Palestinian state. He has negotiated truces with Hamas and released hundreds of Hamas fighters without complaining to Washington.

Netanyahu alternately denies that Abbas has the legitimacy or capacity to deliver on any agreements -- because after all, Hamas and not Abbas controls Gaza -- and condemns Abbas whenever he makes an effort to coordinate with Hamas and forge a unified Palestinian front. 

If Abbas leaves the scene, with or without the Palestinian Authority, Israel will have to invent one. And it is unlikely to get as good an interlocutor as it has right now. 

If Israelis, and Netanyahu, are OK with this state of affairs, then so be it. But the notion of a tangible, sustainable peace WITHOUT a reliable Palestinian partner, or of waiting for a BETTER Palestinian partner to emerge someday -- as though any kind of real status quo could possibly hold in the meantime -- seems absurd.

If there is an alternative to the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, let's hear it (of course, several other options were tried before). Deriving political benefit and scoring rhetorical points off the flaws and failings of Mahmoud Abbas and other moderate Palestinian leaders is no way to build or maintain the possibility for an eventual peace. And yet, this is what Netanyahu's government has been doing all along. Or do they expect two million-plus Palestinians to just ride off into the sunset?

A deal, with or without Pollard?

Once again, Israeli and Palestinian leaders are locked in the endgame of...whether to continue talks. The Obama administration seems increasingly inclined to release the convicted Israeli spy, Jonathan Pollard, to help incentivize Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's release of yet more Palestinian prisoners (to help Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas keep surviving politically) and to take a few demonstrable actions to hold down new settlement construction.

Reportedly, Pollard -- in federal custody since 1986 - has renounced any such deal, saying he doesn't want to be released as an inducement to Israel releasing convicted terrorists (many of them serving as long as himself). Will Pollard refuse to leave his Federal Correctional Facility at the appointed time?

More broadly, Pollard has actively promoted his own release as a cause celebre in Israel and within the organized American Jewish community. This has come at a cost to Israel's national security, by reminding the defense and intelligence community of his (and Israel's) past offenses, and even expressing pride on occasion. If Israel continues to rely on military and intelligence cooperation with the United States, to keep the Jewish state safe from terrorists and other threats, then Pollard has already let his case compromise the safety and security of Israelis.

I wouldn't blame Pollard, but I would also expect him to withhold his own sanctimony about this deal, which is no more or less perverse than the rest of the campaign for his release. Does he honestly believe his own legitimate fight for freedom hasn't come at a cost to Israel?

Many observers believe Pollard was unfairly sentenced to life and so far denied parole (but has he ever applied?). But unlike Gilad Shalit and other Israeli prisoners, he has not been denied due process or visitation, or review under the rule of law. And unlike Gilad Shalit, he will arrive in Israel with a well-developed agenda for Israel and for U.S.-Israel relations. And he won't be satisfied with writing on sports...

As for Netanyahu and Abbas, it's unrealistic to think either of them sees any chance of a substantive, final deal emerging from the current process. Each of them must now be focused on avoiding blame if/when the process collapses, and walking away with as many tangible and political deliverables as possible.

R.I.P., Ariel Sharon - Israel's last visionary leader?

Ariel Sharon's passing is opening a flood of memories back to 1973, including a time when it seemed Israel had options, because its leaders were willing to think big and take risks - and not just for peace. That spirit, which Sharon embodied, still abounds among Israelis, but it seems to me (granted, from a distance) that it's been a while (say, eight years) since the leaders have channeled it. Sharon was the last of that breed.

(Israeli President Shimon Peres is a master visionary, but he serves in a figurehead capacity and will be retiring at the end of his current term.)

I remember, over a span of mere months, from July 1976 to early 1977, Israel liberated the Entebbe hostages and Maccabi Tel-Aviv defeated the Soviet Red Army basketball team, on its way to winning the European cup - a defining moment. 

Menachem Begin's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor was a bold stroke, and even the ill-fated 1982 invasion of Lebanon was audacious. As Defense Minister, Sharon had sought to decapitate the PLO in exile, in the hope that local West Bank leaders would somehow emerge to negotiate Palestinian acquiescence to permanent Israeli control.

There were subsequent moments as well, including Anwar Sadat's dramatic 1978 visit to Jerusalem, at the behest of Menachem Begin which culminated in the Camp David talks and the 1979 peace treaty, and of course Oslo in 1993 and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, led by Yitzhak Rabin. For anyone who remembers 1973, it's still difficult to absorb how much changed in just five years' time.

Sharon, like Rabin before him, was a general whose strategic vision eventually applied itself to securing Israel's survival off the battlefield and far into the future.

Improbably, especially in light of 1982, Sharon reclaimed the activist's mantle just a decade ago, as Prime Minister. He saw that Gaza was lost as an Israeli stronghold, a small piece of beach with well over one million Palestinians. Back then, the half-hearted U.S. peace efforts were actually lagging behind the Israelis and Palestinians, and besides, Sharon didn't see Mahmoud Abbas being able to deliver his side of a bilateral agreement. As Rabin did before him, Sharon realized that - if Israelis and Palestinians can't live together peacefully, then it's better to live separately, beginning with Gaza.

Around Sharon's funeral, numerous and interlocking calculations were being made. The official statements from the White House and State Department seemed careful not to underplay Sharon's significance, as a positive message to Israel's current Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, nor to shower so much praise that Netanyahu feels slighted by contrast. In his eulogy at the funeral, Netanyahu replayed his own mantras about the Holocaust and Iran. U.S. Vice President Biden, leading the U.S. delegation, extolled Sharon's bravery in evacuating Gaza and reiterated President Obama's unwavering commitment to the U.S.-Israel alliance.

In itself, the fact that Biden was there, eight years after Sharon left the scene under a massive stroke, underscored the abiding value and honor Washington attaches to Israeli leaders who are willing to take control of their destiny. At the end, it was Sharon's private secretary and a war buddy who evoked his personal tenderness and devotion in a way that truly transcended official protocol and convention. 

My biggest regret today was the ring of truth to Biden's closing quote from Shakespeare: We "shall not look upon his like again."

Netanyahu's fantasy date with destiny

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently acted as though Israel has a veto on any negotiations with Iran, as though reminding world powers - and Tehran - that Iran's nuclear program is only a concern for Israel and not for the entire region and the international community. Every step forward in the process has been derided, every sanction discounted, even as he says it's better than nothing. Even as he acts like the judge for all nations.

Netanyahu speaks as though only he and only Israel are concerned or actively fighting Iran's ambitions. He has already ridiculed the discussions underway in Geneva as "The Deal of the Century," even though limiting - and not completely dismantling - Iran's nuclear program was always the stated goal. He warns us all not to trust Iran, as though anyone outside Tehran trusts that regime. Anyone. This isn't about world leaders being naive, it's about working within political and strategic realities.

What Netanyahu won't acknowledge, is that neither Israel nor America has a way to decisively stop Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. The best option is some deal for verifiable controls on further enrichment and weaponization. While dismissing the use of sanctions or negotiations, the Prime Minister has offered no realistic alternative. None. 

Despite his tough talk, there is no surefire way to deny Iran a nuclear capability. Sanctions, blockade and assassinations have pushed Iran to the point of considering measures to verify and limit its program going forward. There has never been a point at which any U.S. President or Israeli Prime Minister could have permanently neutralized Iran's program, either successfully and effectively or without Israelis paying a catastrophic political and economic cost. Israel's own military experts have routinely warned against attacking Iran.

Bibi talks the talk, about talks

The latest Mideast peace effort by Secretary of State John Kerry and some of the Gulf states is encouraging, but there's little new that hasn't been available to Israel and the Palestinians during the past five years. A little reality check never hurts.

A top Palestinian representative has just revealed that Israeli and Palestinian negotiators had a series of talks over two years ago, but no negotiations, until the Israeli side discontinued the talks -- apparently without explanation. These preliminary 'talks about talks' even culminated in a face-to-face between Yasser Abed Rabbo and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The first reaction I'm reading. and which I share, is that this means there's still some hope for an eventual return to kind of negotiations that had once been seen as natural and unremarkable. 

My own second reaction? Abed Rabbo's claim refutes Netanyahu's narrative that there is no one to talk to, that Israel is ready to re-open negotiations but for the unwillingness of the Palestinians to return to the table. 

Last fall, when the Palestinian Authority scored upgraded State Observer status at the United Nations, Netanyahu called the move a violation of the 1993 Oslo Accords which undermines the possibility of a two-state solution. As I wrote at the time:

...the average Israeli would literally laugh at the idea that the Oslo Accords were anything but a failure, so why pretend they still care about preserving or fulfilling Oslo? Arguing that Netanyahu actually wants to negotiate a realistic two-state solution, without preconditions; that Israel eschews unilateral actions; that Israel has no partner for negotiations -- this should be insulting to most people who have an understanding of the issue. Those making such claims come off as either dishonest or naive. And it does not help Israel advance its case to anyone who's not already convinced.

Obama's low-risk, low-yield Israel visit

Any visit by the U.S. President is a big deal, especially to a country like Israel that follows every hiccup in Washington with great interest and anxiety. But from the American side, it will be more show than tell, with little chance of candor or contention. 

President Obama's upcoming visit to Israel will not be launching or leading to any new ventures into Middle East peacemaking. Both he and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are still getting their teams in place after each was just re-elected. And there's still plenty of institutional memory in the Obama White House to understand what Hillary Clinton learned from her husband's experience, and from her own as recent Secretary of State: Netanyahu is just not that guy.

Thanks to Netanyahu -- and many Israelis evidently are grateful for this -- Israel's 15 minutes of relevance are now up, at least for this political era. By relevance, I mean, as far as making the Middle East easier for the United States; being considered part of Washington's decision team along with other allies like the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Japan, NATO, et al. Ironically, the closest partnership in the U.S.-Israeli relationship is now between Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and newly confirmed Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, whose nomination was almost torpedoed by Netanyahu's true friends in Washington.

Obama tried to move the Israeli and Palestinian sides back to where they were just before Netanyahu, with regular talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders, but to no avail. Obama even earned himself lectures from Netanyahu, in his own White House. Rather than looking ridiculous for trying to get a full-fledged Israeli settlement freeze before Netanyahu completed sidelining the Palestinian moderates, Obama instead can focus on Syria and Iran. By his response to those two imminent threats, it's Netanyahu who often looks a little silly -- complaining of U.S. appeasement one day, affirming Washington's and even the UN's strategies the very next day.

The President knows to tell Israelis -- and Netanyahu -- just what they want to hear: Great job, "never again" (Iran, Holocaust), number-one ally anywhere, got your back, Iron Dome, Am Yisrael Chai. Meet some students, collect Presidential medal, and board Air Force One. It appears he won't even have to brave an address to the newly sworn-in, untested and traditionally testy Knesset.

As Obama begins his second and final term, he still has to contend with Afghanistan, Syria and Iran in the Middle East, plus Russia, China and other challenges worldwide. Domestically, he faces his biggest headaches on just about every possible front. With no substantive Watergate-style scandal that needs distracting by Henry Kissinger, there would be little reason to devote precious political capital to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations even if it looked like Israel and the Palestinians were available. And they are not.

A few weeks ago, I waved a yellow flag over the notion that assigning moderate Tzipi Livni to shepherd the peace process was anything more than a cosmetic bluff by Netanyahu. As Justice Minister and head of her own new party, Livni will be in no position to take any meaningful peace initiatives, especially since the ruling Likud Party will be keeping the Foreign Affairs portfolio for itself. This means anything she tries will be subject to interference and veto by Avigdor Lierberman -- likely to return as Foreign Minister -- and the Prime Minister himself. When Lieberman filled in for Netanyahu to deliver Israel's speech to the annual opening of the United Nations General Assembly, he spent much of his time justifying population transfer -- 'nuf said?

Netanyahu will get to impress his hometown crowd, and Obama will have kicked off his second term by silencing many of his critics from within the pro-Israel (and Jewish establishment). If something unforeseen suddenly creates an opening for renewed peace efforts, Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry can always answer the call as needed -- as long as they don't think they'll be wasting their time. There's been enough of that already.

Don't worry, Livni will not be making peace

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's choice of his political foe Tzipi Livni to be his new Justice Minister, and to oversee the Palestinian peace track, suggests there will be little meaningful Israeli effort on that front in the foreseeable future. Picking Livni to "run" the peace process gives him a six-seat edge in assembling the rest of his coalition, and it keeps Livni preoccupied with an issue that most Israelis now consider secondary.

During his past four years as Prime Minister, regardless of shortcomings on the Palestinian side, Netanyahu has shown little urgency or enthusiasm for re-engaging them or shoring up the moderate faction led by Mahmoud Abbas. Although he lost Knesset seats in the latest election, this had little to do with the peace process, which only ranked as a priority with those voting for... Tzipi Livni. And Livni scored worse than expected at the polls.

Livni does not enjoy Netanyahu's confidence, and she now controls only six seats through her new Tnu'ah (Movement) Party -- meaning Netanyahu has little to lose by ignoring or undermining anything she does. Even better, it helps keep any of his more powerful competitors (especially the pragmatic Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid) from using their significant capital to push the peace envelope.

Ironically, those who voted for Livni because they wanted a resumption of substantive peace talks with the Palestinians would do better if Netanyahu placed the negotiations under a trusted ally or lieutenant, rather than an arch-rival who commands only six out of the total 120 seats in the Knesset. 

And the Justice Minister, really? From Camp David to Oslo (which included the treaty with Jordan), any effective peace process has been run through the Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign Ministry. In his previous government, Netanyahu handled the peace process on his own, without involving then-Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, without any progress. Now he proposes to run the peace process out of the Justice Ministry, which has little infrastructure or disposition for running international negotiations outside of strictly legal matters and always in collaboration with the Foreign Ministry. 

Alternatively, if Netanyahu truly cared about getting back on track toward a two-state solution rather than leveraging his coalition strategy, he could have prevailed upon his predecessor and recent Defense Minister Ehud Barak to stay on with the peace portfolio. Barak knows all the players, and generally behaved himself (at least by Israeli standards) under Netanyahu until last month's elections when he left the Knesset. He enjoys the trust of President Obama and his team, which has eluded Netanyahu. And with no Knesset seats of his own, Barak would be exclusively answerable to Netanyahu and immune from the temptations of coalition infighting.

What does Livni get from this deal? A former Foreign Minister herself, she gets to try for results with the Palestinians, against uncertain yet formidable odds. Perhaps more importantly, she gets to be in the government, which is the best consolation prize for someone who thinks she should be the Prime Minister and got kicked out of leadership in her former Kadima Party. Knowing that with six seats she will not be leading the opposition this time around, Livni has little reason not to join the government.

Most likely, Netanyahu won't even need Livni's Knesset votes to maintain his ultimate coalition in the long term. He can use her early entry to the government to punish or at least pressure Yair Lapid, head of the centrist Yesh Atid and its 19 seats. Most of Lapid's voters expected Netanyahu to be Prime Minister, and trusted Lapid and his top deputies to be their voice WITHIN the government, so it's almost inconceivable he won't end up joining the coalition.

Having Livni on board now also helps Netanyahu prepare for President Obama's March visit, though a high-stakes Presidential delegation is a risky test-run for inter-agency cooperation between the Justice and Foreign Ministries on the Israeli side, and the White House, State Department and Secret Service on the U.S. side. Beyond logistics, the optics are better if a credible peacemaker (or peace-attempter) is on hand for Obama's visit -- especially since Netanyahu will not be greeting the President with any significant openings on the Palestinian front. Not now, not later.

Negotiating with Hamas, but for the wrong reason?

Whether to advance a peace agreement leading to a Palestinian state or to consolidate the status quo, an Israeli government will probably be talking to Hamas before too long.

Twenty years ago, Israeli law prohibited any Israeli citizen from contact with the Palestine Liberation. As Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir put it, talking to the PLO would lead to the unacceptable establishment of a Palestinian state. And center-left politicians, including Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres agreed. So when Rabin became the PM and Peres his Foreign Minister, they pursued indirect contacts with the PLO precisely because they had realized that a separate Palestinian state was indispensable to Israel's long-term stability.

Today, the idea of "a PLO state bordering Israel" sounds pretty bad, but it remains the official preference of the Government of Israel... even if the actions of Israel's current leadership seem to be making that outcome progressively less likely. When President Ronald Reagan authorized the U.S. Government to talk directly with the PLO 24 years ago, the PLO was still on the State Department's list of Foreign Terror Organizations -- as is Hamas today.

But it was still the Cold War, PLO leader Yasir Arafat had met the specific conditions the United States had pledged to Israel, and Vice-President George H.W. Bush had already won the election to succeed the departing Reagan. There was little Israel or American Jewish organizations could do beyond calling for strict controls. Within five years, partly thanks to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and serious strong-arming by then-Secretary of State James A. Baker III, the Bush administration helped set the stage for the 1993 Oslo Accords.

Today, the memory of Hamas terror is constantly refreshed by new attacks on Israeli civilians, and Hamas leaders speak regularly of destroying Israel. The PLO once acted the same way, and that bitter legacy will never be erased. And yet, the Oslo Accords were signed between Israel and the PLO, and PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas is generally seen as the best chance for a moderate Palestinian leader willing to make a final deal with Israel.

Some Jews don't like Chuck Hagel... so?

President Obama has just won re-election. As some Republican Senators have acknowledged, "elections have consequences." One consequence of this election was that, despite the best efforts of Jewish Republicans in and out of community leadership roles, the President won a healthy margin of the Electoral College -- so the pro-Netanyahu wing of the pro-Israel (Jewish) community has political credibility issues. Plus the President showed unflinching solidarity (including Iron Dome) with Israel during last month's Gaza conflict with Hamas.

I do not know if Chuck Hagel would be the best choice for Secretary of Defense, but barring any major disclosures or failings, that choice is the President's to make. A Vietnam veteran and former Republican Senator, Hagel is widely respected in military and policy circles, and his professional qualifications seem fine. The Senate Republicans already forced out the President's putative nominee for Secretary of State, Susan Rice, and stopping one of their own former colleagues now would be  bit much. This is not going to be an easy fight, especially if it's on behalf of an ally that's already getting too much play in Washington politics.

A winning strategy for Jewish leaders is ideally to be part of the solution, and not to pick fights with Presidents unless Israel's survival is directly threatened. The best case against Hagel seems to be that he's not a bleeding-heart Zionist; he supports U.S. engagement on Mideast peace; he was one of the few Senators who routinely avoided signing onto pro forma "Dear Colleague" letters in support of Israeli interests; and, the same people who slam President Obama's positions on Israel also slam Hagel.

Interestingly, the Jewish establishment leaped to support Susan Rice, however briefly, because she has been so stalwart in support of Israel as the President's Ambassador to the United Nations. Many were concerned when she was first nominated four years ago, because her worldview seemed closer to all those leftists calling on Israel to get with the 21st century, drop all the nationalism sentiment, and cut a quick deal with the Palestinians. So maybe her eyes were opened, or maybe she was serving President Obama and advancing HIS agenda. I would expect a Secretary Hagel to do no less.

Defense cooperation with Israel is better than ever. Ever. We're still taking casualties in Afghanistan and fighting a global commando war against Al Qaeda. I voted for Barack Obama last month, and so did most Americans -- and two-thirds of Jews -- who went to the polls. Standing in the way of his nominee because he's not Joe Lieberman is just a bad idea, and one my Jewish Republican friends are eagerly pushing.

Israeli Foreign Minister's audacity of dope

[Just after posting this, I heard that Minister Lieberman is resigning in the face of a criminal indictment... but the Czechoslovakia argument remains a common refrain among right-wing Israelis. And Lieberman will probably get re-elected in the January 22 elections and remain a force in the Knesset.]

Regarding concessions to the Palestinians, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said this week that European governments must know that Israel "will not be a second Czechoslovakia." Really??

The Foreign Minister's umbrage aside, his choice of analogy was truly baffling. Czechoslovakia, after all, was a weak, artificial proto-state, formed out of the negative space after World War I obliterated the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1939, Adolf Hitler forcibly ANNEXED the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, claiming it as a German heartland. At the now-infamous Munich conference, the European powers effective handed the Sudetenland over to Adolf Hitler, the regional juggernaut, in a failed bid to placate Germany's lust for conquest. Over the months that followed, it became evident that the appeasement of Munich was the international community's gateway to the Holocaust.

Since 1967, Israel has used similar terminology and actions by "annexing" East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Right-wing Israeli politicians have perennially called for "annexing" all or part of the West Bank, pointing to the large Jewish settler population as a justification. And if there is a regional hegemon today, based on military and economic might, it is Israel and not the Palestinians.

So... If we're applying the Munich-Czechoslovakia model to Israel and the West Bank, who would be Czechoslovakia and who would be Hitler? The perverse answer to such a question is why it's so shocking that any Israeli politician would apply the Czechoslovakia model. Israel is NOT the Third Reich, so why use an example where the aggressor was a powerful country annexing lands where its people are settled, at the expense of the weaker rump state?

There are many valid arguments for why Europeans should be more supportive of Israel and harder on the Palestinians, especially the terrorist elements. But "Czechoslovakia" is nothing but a shrill play of the Holocaust card, hoping that no one will notice it is utter nonsense. So far, especially with Israeli elections a few weeks down the road, that bet is paying off.

"Ilaynaa?" This is us you're talking to...

This year's Manama Dialogue, back after skipping last year amid Bahrain's internal strife, has produced some notable public statements and many private conversations. There's a tremendous degree of up-to-the-tweet knowledge and keen interest about what's going on in Washington, not to mention around the Middle East. The U.S. and other delegations have been delivering alternate doses of reality and humility to the mostly Arab participants -- government and military officials, as well as media and policy experts. [I am here again as a grateful guest of Bahrain's Foreign Ministry.]


So far, the most audacious statements have come from Qatar's foreign minister, who suggested to the audience that Syria's rebel forces could use MANPADS (shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles) to secure a no-fly zone. He dismissed concerns that such weapons finding their way out of the country and into the hands of terrorists, as happened in Libya: Syria is different, because its neighbors are all secure and stable!! Who knew...

The cheekiest question from the floor was addressed to the U.S. delegation by a drôle Brit (who else?): "How long are the American people prepared to continue to bankroll the security of Chinese oil supplies?" Ouch.

Senator John McCain delivered a strong case for greater U.S. leadership and involvement in the region, including military intervention in Syria and more engagement and democracy-building on the ground in Libya. As a reflection of Washington's complicated politics, the Senator has recently devoted much of his time to assailing the Obama administration for the attack that killed four Americans in Libya, who were there precisely as part of the President's commitment to engage Libyans and help them build a democratic society.

Generally, there was little emphasis on the Israeli-Palestinian issue this time, whereas two years ago Jordan's King Abdullah made that the focus of his speech here. The curtain-raiser was a panel on Syria, which included a leader of the Syrian opposition, and only at the very end, China's Middle East envoy threw in -- non sequitur -- that the Palestinian issue remains the biggest problem in the Middle East. No doubt, our Syrian friend got home safely by now...

Beyond Syria, Egypt remains a major item on the Manama agenda. It looks like some of the Egyptian delegation failed to make the trip after all, including the General who heads "Crisis Management" for the Egyptian Armed Forces. The second day's sessions concluded before the news of Egyptian President Morsi's scaling back much of his decree for unchecked power, which may mean the restrained U.S. response to that crisis actually worked -- let's see what the buzz is on Sunday...

There is ambient frustration with the U.S. Government over the sense that Washington has withdrawn from the Middle East, including from the Israeli-Palestinian issue, exhausted as we are from waging two major wars in this region and now peering over The Fiscal Cliff. 

While conspicuously omitting America from the list of nations that were helpful to Bahrain through its recent turmoil, Crown Prince Salman's keynote did give a little pitch (or dig) for us to get "the state of Israel" back into negotiations. In other words, while according Israel all due legitimacy, His Royal Highness asks if Washington can maybe do one little bit of heavy lifting once and for all. With flag officers in the room, of course, it's also hard to forget that Bahrain is home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which patrols the waters of the Gulf and Straits of Hormuz among other strategically vital sectors. Let's just say, both parties benefit from the arrangement. And as it happened, Senator McCain was late arriving from Kuwait, so he was not in the room for this royal treatment.

More significantly, the Crown Prince emphasized and acknowledged the trauma his country has endured since our 2010 session, with many mistakes by the authorities that need to be addressed and corrected going forward. In this, his speech was not so much PROMISING a "new Middle East" as DELIVERING it in substance. Time will tell as to implementation and fulfillment, but it was no ordinary speech. And he predicted more substantive announcements in the coming days.

Picking up on the Crown Prince's appeal, British Foreign Secretary William Hague also called on the United States to re-engage Israel and the Palestinians before time really runs out. He framed his entire speech within a spirit of humility, noting he is "not a citizen of the Middle East" and therefore not prepared to lecture Middle Easterners about their own region. Obviously, his most immediate concern was the situation in Syria, and there was much deliberation throughout the sessions about the efficacy of internal resistance and outside diplomacy, and heated calls for military intervention, with or without waiting for the Assad regime to deploy chemical weapons (and with or without Russia's imprimatur). Military and security experts were also confident they can secure Syria's weapons stockpiles once Assad is gone. If...

Hague and the Americans -- and the Saudis -- paid special attention to Iran's role in the region, as well as its nuclear program. As we take on the progress and challenges of a "new" Middle East, it's also sobering that the region's two biggest flash points are Egypt and Syria. A half-century ago, these two key Arab nations were briefly united into one country by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who heralded a new kind of pan-Arab Middle East. Nasser's promise largely failed, and today we face new and distinct changes, risks and potential in both countries, with consequences for the entire Middle East and beyond.

The four-state solution and other realities

The greatest irony of the past week has been Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's insistence that the United Nations vote to upgrade Palestine's observer status was a unilateral action that undermines negotiations for a two-state solution. Netanyahu's response to such unilateralism was to announce his own unilateral move that specifically undermines a two-state solution: authorizing settlement construction to connect Jerusalem and Maaleh Adumim, which would effectively split the West Bank in half. The four-state solution would be Israel, Gaza, West Bank north, and West Bank south. Now who's undermining whom?

The main takeaway from this should be that the current Israeli government is in no way committed to a two-state solution, or to meaningful negotiations. This should come as no surprise to anyone, including most Israelis of any bandwidth. Every time Netanyahu calls for a return to negotiations, he or his underlings manage to take some unilateral action of their own, usually relating to growing Israel's West Bank settlements or neighborhoods within the ever-expanding definition of "Jerusalem".

Regardless of one's preferred path or destination, several myths deserve to be discontinued:

UNILATERAL ACTIONS

Both Palestinians and Israelis are engaged in unilateral actions. The main differences are that Palestinian unilateralism tends to manifest periodically at the diplomatic level. Israeli unilateralism is evident on the ground and continues every day, via security checkpoints, ongoing construction projects, and restrictions on Palestinian economic activity. Justified or not, these are all unilateral actions, and not the subject of bilateral negotiations or agreement. And like it or not, going to the UN may interfere with the very hypothetical potential for direct negotiations, but it's hard to call anything garnering the support of 138 governments entirely "unilateral". (For better or worse, Israel's withdrawal from Gaza was a completely unilateral decision.)

PRECONDITIONS

There's nothing wrong with having preconditions for negotiations, as long as we are all open about their existence. Both sides have preconditions, and it's a stretch to suggest otherwise. Israel's calls for Abbas to return to the table without preconditions ring hollow when -- in the same breath -- we are told he must first recognize Israel as a "Jewish state". No other entity in the world has had to make such a declaration as a condition for negotiations, full diplomatic relations or even military alliance with Israel, and until the past year this was never even stated vis-a-vis the Palestinians. (Just weeks ago, on Israeli television, Abbas himself ruled out a Palestinian return to pre-1967 Israel.) But it is definitely a precondition, no less than the Palestinian insistence that Israel forswear further settlement growth while negotiations are underway. When Hamas and Fatah seemed close to reconciling their differences last year, Israel revived one of its old preconditions, that any such union must reaffirm the core principles, including renouncing terror and accepting Israel's right to exist (as a Jewish state or not). 

UNDERMINING A TWO-STATE SOLUTION

Netanyahu's response to what he termed the undermining of the two-state solution was to... undermine the two state solution. Expanding or initiating new settlements anywhere but the area known as "E1" area might be seen as a counter-productive but proportional response to the upgrading of Palestinian status at the UN. But by announcing construction that merges the Edumim settlements bloc with Jerusalem -- while cutting off the provisional Palestinian capital of Ramallah and the northern West Bank (Biblical Samaria) from the south (Biblical Judea) -- Netanyahu is expressly writing off any interest in the increasingly anachronistic "two-state solution" involving Israel and a viable Palestinian state.

HAMAS

Hamas terrorism, including the massive missile barrage against Israel's civilian population, must be denounced and punished. But intentionally or not, one effect of Israeli retaliation is to bolster Hamas among Palestinians, at the expense of Abbas. Israel's reaction to the UN vote is a case in point. One of the more valid arguments against the Palestinian status upgrade was the absence of Palestinian consensus over who is the rightful representative -- can Abbas truly claim to represent all Palestinians when he comes to the UN, or when/if he sits down with Netanyahu at the negotiating table? That said, if Israel's right-wing coalition government had any interest in a negotiated agreement, wouldn't it try to find ways of making it easier for Abbas to negotiate, instead of making it harder at every turn? Hamas is a useful excuse, and one that keeps benefiting from each setback.

Personally, I find it much easier, and more effective, to explain Israeli actions as simply a popular decision by a right-wing government, representing a right-shifted population that has lost hope in the prospect of peace; since long before last week, the average Israeli would literally laugh at the idea that the Oslo Accords were anything but a failure, so why pretend they still care about preserving or fulfilling Oslo? Arguing that Netanyahu actually wants to negotiate a realistic two-state solution, without preconditions; that Israel eschews unilateral actions; that Israel has no partner for negotiations -- this should be insulting to most people who have an understanding of the issue. Those making such claims come off as either dishonest or naive. And it does not help Israel advance its case to anyone who's not already convinced.

Condemning Palestinian statehood won't help Israel

The United Nations General Assembly will vote today to accord Palestine upgraded Observer status as a non-member state. Had the U.S. Congress been more supportive of the Oslo process following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, had the international community exerted more pressure on Yasser Arafat, had Shimon Peres called earlier elections to capture the Rabin sympathy vote, had President George W. Bush not insisted on early elections in Gaza that put Hamas legally in charge there, this might have happened ten years ago, and with full membership for Palestine. But that's not what happened.

So today, on the anniversary of the UN's 1947 Palestine Partition plan, Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas is calling on the UN to recognize Palestine as a state. Some of the normal prerequisites for statehood status remain unfulfilled: There are no permanent, recognized, demarcated borders; the territory is ruled by two different governments; and the terms of the Oslo Accords mandate the Palestinian and Israeli sides to cooperate and agree on final status, including statehood.

But realistically, Oslo has been dead for several years, and certainly since President Bush backed off serious efforts to facilitate progress between the two parties. Realizing this, Ehud Olmert, Israel's Prime Minister at the time, continued his own regular meetings with Abbas and even followed through on Ariel Sharon's planned unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. And today, Olmert himself is backing the Palestinian bid. For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has done little to back up his public calls for Abbas to return to the negotiating table, while expanding Jewish settlements across the West Bank and empowering Hamas while generally ignoring Abbas.

Especially following the recent conflict between Israel and Hamas, and the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire, Abbas needs to proceed with today's vote. He needs to show something to remain relevant, and Israelis who retain any hope for eventual peace should realize that they need Abbas to succeed over Hamas, in the West Bank as well as Gaza.

While today's vote is not a vote against the existence of Israel, it definitely has an element of rejecting Israeli settlement expansion and U.S. neglect of proactive diplomacy. There are no guarantees, and today's vote may be ill-timed. And it will be used by Iran and others to cynically advance their campaign to isolate Israel diplomatically and otherwise. But the Palestinians will get their way today, albeit without the support of Israel or the United States. Given this reality, where do we go from here?

Israel and the United States have already decided to downplay the statehood status. This is more constructive than just cursing the darkness, but far from lighting a match. A year ago, the last time Palestinian statehood was being advanced at the UN, I blogged on how much easier it would be for Netanyahu to just work on peace negotiations with Abbas, both substantively and tactically as a way to undermine or forestall any statehood effort.

Even Netanyahu, and his coalition partners who more openly reject any territorial compromise, can reap some advantage from today's fait accompli. They can begin treating Abbas as the leader of a state -- not with ticker-tape parades through Tel Aviv, but by signing more formal agreements from economic relations to security cooperation and holding him more accountable for results. They can play up his role as the internationally recognized leader rather than giving Hamas more opportunities to escalate tensions and overshadow Abbas.

We can also use this as an opportunity to get more economic development and investment into the West Bank, by calling on European governments voting "yes" on statehood to put their money where their mouths are. Any effort to penalize Abbas for pushing the statehood issue will further erode his credibility and that of the peaceful path (Hamas has shown that terrorism gets better play with Israel). Israel needs a strong, vibrant, secure and prosperous Palestinian neighbor, and this is according to Prime Minister Netanyahu himself.

Jewish organizations should feel free to condemn and criticize today's vote, but afterward they should also be held to account. If we as a community reject unilateral measures, and we claim that today's vote undermines the path of direct negotiations and a two-state solution, what will we be doing in 2013 to achieve that oft-stated goal? Are we willing to back up our own rhetoric with candid advice to Israeli leaders, with our own funds to support Israeli-Palestinian cooperative enterprises, and to promote genuine dialogue and engagement between Jews and Palestinians?

As Jews prepare to celebrate Chanukah, the Festival of Lights, we should consider whether we will continue to curse the darkness, just keep quiet, or start lighting flames to brighten the room we call the Middle East. If we as a community are not up to that task, then silence may be the best answer going forward. Merely paying lip service to a "two-state solution" can no longer help Israel or the Palestinians, and it won't stop Iran from achieving nuclear-blackmail capability.

Gaza's gifts

It is intolerable for Israel's major population centers to be under attack. Ideally, Israel wants a cease-fire with Hamas, with international guarantees, or at least some outside verification, which will further elevate Israel's claims for the next time around. Israel's military offensive to neutralize the rockets and missiles being launched from Gaza against Israeli civilians also has broader and less direct implications.

ANTIDOTE TO ABBAS

As well, this is not the first time a right-wing Israeli government elevates Hamas at the expense of the more moderate PLO, now embodied in the Palestinian Authority as headed by Mahmoud Abbas. During the 1980s, Israel did not mind the ascendance of Hamas as a way of hampering the PLO's operational and political strength.

In addition to making Israelis more secure -- at least in the short term -- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reaps further political advantage by diminishing Abbas and reducing the Palestinian leader's capacity to sustain a moderate course that might eventually compel Israel to finalize territorial compromises leading to a viable Palestinian state. Such an agreement and such a state used to be an Israeli goal, but under Netanyahu these are reduced to mere rhetorical flourishes. Beyond further cutting down Abbas, the Gaza operation also distracts attention from any potential peace initiative heading into the second Obama term. These may not have been considerations in his decision to counter-attack now, but they must definitely be seen as fringe benefits.