Iran's sense of vulnerability casts a wide net

The Gulf expects more from the United States, and less from Iran. Surprised?

On the military side, admirals and generals want to know our plans and protocols for managing the threat from Iran, on tactical as well as strategic levels. Politically, diplomats and bloggers alike blame us for letting Mubarak fall in favor of the new Islamist Pharaoh, Mohamed Morsi. On Syria, opinion is divided on whether the United States ought to directly intervene militarily or simply provide advanced weapons to the rebels. But then maybe, judging from the current blowback on Morsi and his ascendant Muslim Brotherhood, we should be stepping in to prop up Syrian President Bashar Assad... Stability vs. democracy, or secular vs. religious autocracy.

Reflecting the outdated relevance of Wikileaks, Gulf regimes are no longer itching for a U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Instead, they are acutely aware that if Iran gets lucky with just one anti-ship mine, all oil shipments will come to a standstill. The closer Iran gets to achieving "breakout" capacity, or to crossing one of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's ever-shifting "red lines", the more regional leaders understand that neither diplomatic nor military options promise an easy resolution. And once again, regardless of the nuclear file, Iran's ongoing opportunism is evident in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and potentially Bahrain. The regime in Tehran is as happy to take advantage of popular Arab unrest as it was to seize full control of Abu Musa from the United Arab Emirates 20 years ago (or to regain its former sovereignty, according to the Iranians).

For all their defiance and bluster, Iranians remain concerned about their own rights to security and national self-defense: The entire punitive premise of international nuclear negotiators and the sanctions backing them up leaves Iranians feeling humiliated and cornered. This is not merely posturing -- it's a genuine feeling.

I do not discount Iran's violation of international treaties and conventions on the transparency and verifiability of its nuclear program, nor its propensity to support terrorism and undermine diplomatic solutions, especially where the Israelis and Palestinians are concerned. Sure, Iran is responsible for its current dilemma. But so long as Iran feels deep down that its very sovereignty and survival are being threatened, it is unlikely to willingly give up what has become its nuclear insurance policy.

While the West cannot afford to back down, it is increasingly likely that Iran will nevertheless succeed in attaining nuclear weapons capacity within the next five years. Leveraging the existing and future sanctions and other measures, it may be possible to fashion a process and terms of reference that acknowledge and allay Iranian fears and also establish a framework for taking the centrifuges off line.

An Iran that WANTS to own nuclear weapons can potentially be deterred. An Iran that feels it NEEDS to own nuclear weapons will be truly dangerous and unpredictable. If our efforts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran are able to address both points, we just might succeed in the short term and also open the door to a long-term process of normalization.

Mideast revolutions, one at a time

Visiting Romania in the 1970s and '80s, it was impossible to understand how one sector of the population could completely stifle all dissent and resistance. But it was equally inconceivable that someday the people would rise up, and the dictator would be subject to their swift justice. Then suddenly, one day it happened.

Recent events across the Middle East defy easy explanation. As I pointed out a couple of weeks ago, no single empire or coordinated ideology is holding back Arab and Middle East nations -- not Ottomans, French, British, Communists, mullahs. Each country has its own unique set of circumstances and personalities, its own culture and identity. There is no unified tsunami of freedom sweeping the region, but there was obvious inspiration from Tunisia, reinforced by widespread solidarity with Egyptians. The stronger, indirect impact of events is already being felt in the Mideast peace process, between the rival Palestinian factions, and among leaders in the region.

Last year's post-election demonstrations in Iran clearly had some influence on Tunisians, and perhaps some of the Wikileaks cables did as well. There was no way to predict when (or even if) the Ben-Ali regime would fall, precisely because it appears to have been spontaneous -- the right martyr, at the right time, with the right combination of popular forces. Many Egyptians were already anticipating a showdown next September, when Mubarak was expected to let his son succeed him through the usual fixed election, and then Tunisia happened.

Beyond Egypt, the Hashemites in Jordan have survived far worse than last week's demonstrations, and King Abdullah retains the loyalty of the military and key tribes -- and without 50 million hungry mouths to feed. In Yemen, President Saleh hastened to announce his retirement in another two years -- anyway, Yemen has already been suffering from an insurgency and civil war, so revolution will have to take a number. The Gulf states are too wealthy, with too few people, to invite much "revolution", and palace coups happen on their own timetable. 

Quote of the Day: Classified...

Just because a document is classified does not mean it's either useful or accurate.

Wikileaks on Iran? Get over it. Quickly.

Many Israelis -- official and otherwise -- have been enjoying a victory lap over the Wikileaks dump of classified U.S. diplomatic cables. On Iran, the cable traffic reports several Arab leaders calling for the United States to attack Iran, or better yet... attack Iran. 

Few are suggesting the United States or Israel should attack Iran just because some Arab leaders think it would be either a nice idea or a last resort. But, the argument goes, this proves that Arab leaders are more worried about Iran as a threat than about Israel and the Palestinians. Not exactly a ringing endorsement...

First, do Israelis really feel proud because they’re considered less of a menace than the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is widely understood to be pursuing a massive nuclear program and sponsoring terrorism and subversion across the Middle East and as far away as Paraguay?

Second, if the Israeli-Palestinian issue is less of a concern to Arab governments than Iran is, this means Arabs may be less available on the giving side in any give-and-take to resolve the Palestinian issue. If the Arabs again wash their hands of the Palestinians, Qatar and Oman are less likely to feel the pain than Israel will. If anything, getting Arabs MORE worried about the Palestinian issue could be useful to Israel’s long-term goal of finalizing its borders and normalizing its status within the region. 

Wikileaks, #cablegate, and a new dictatorship of information

What to make of the latest document dump via Wikileaks? The information is very interesting, partly because of which diplomat or world leader is saying what. 

Perhaps this level of detail isn’t necessary to drawing intelligent conclusions about international developments and policies. Most likely, the fact of who said what about whom will undermine some relationships going forward. Clearly, few if any crimes of note have been revealed thus far in the release of U.S. diplomatic cables. 

For some of us who fancy ourselves to be in the know, some of these revelations reduce the advantage of our “inside information”. I have heard from Arab officials of their sympathy for a U.S. or Israeli air strike on Iran, for example, but now that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is quoted to that effect in an official U.S. document, any account I can give seems both obvious and minor by comparison.

For those diplomats still serving in the posts from which they faithfully sent these leaked cables, their ability to continue performing their duties may face new barriers. How does one pass through a receiving line when everyone knows you reported to Washington on rumors about the hostess? 

The long-term danger is that cable traffic might get dumbed down to “just the facts”, eliminating the nuance that makes diplomatic decisions and the eventual history files so rich and sophisticated. With email, Twitter and blogs, however the sharing of information and opinions has already erased a certain level of privacy and thoughtfulness in ways that are probably irreversible. “Crowd-sourcing” may be great for many things, but it does not drive the powers of human imagination and creativity. 

Without denigrating or demonizing the Wikileaks team, who have definitely tapped into a fascinating set of documents, it is difficult to see justification for the wholesale dissemination of privileged communications. Will a military crisis or natural disaster be averted by this? Will democracy and freedom triumph over evil? Was this really done for the public good? 

In trying to stop a few would-be terrorists (which the evidence suggests it has failed to do), the Transportation Security Administration proposes to body-scan or feel-search every single airline passenger -- hoarding assets that could otherwise be devoted to actually catching terrorists. Is the Wikileaks "no more secrets" approach any less of a distraction from the real crimes of state taking place around the world, under our noses, while we immerse ourselves in mountains of cables?

Wikileaks is literally self-appointed and answerable to no one, so its leaders cannot claim to be acting in anyone’s interests but their own -- unless they purport to be virtual dictators. A dictatorship of information? And from the noise of thousands upon thousands of cables and revelations, will we be any wiser? Will our policymakers become any more sober, or less? Time to reach for my Bose noise-canceling head phones...